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I 
INTRODUCTORY 
To speak of war today is most certainly to lay onself open 
to bitter criticism. Therefo~e it may be well to state the point 
of view taken in the present discussion. It is no part of the 
plan either to attenuate the evil consequent on war, or to mini-
mize the grave considerations incumbent on those who contemplate 
war; and much less to make light of the opinions of writers who 
approach or even state categorically the doctrine of the impos-
sibility of a just war in modern times. The approach is rather 
that of the moralist who tries to consider the problems objec-
tively and impartially in an attempt to reach a true solution, 
or, because of the complexity of the situations, contents him-
self with clearing up some of the confusion as a stepping-stone 
to further clarification or solution by some one else. In s~ch 
cases he may perhaps hazard a personal opinion indicating the 
general trend of a possible solution. 
Whenever, therefore, exception is taken to the argument of 
another, an exception which de facto would give a freer hand in 
the matter of war, it is not made because it is less stringent, 
but only because such an opinion seems based on invalid, insuf-
ficient or irrelevant grounds. Neither are such less severe jud 
ments recommended as ideals; they are, as is usual in treating 
of moral matters, negative norms beyond which action is definit 
ly illicit. 
s 
The general reason for so treating the problems that arise 
for discussion is the conviction that war cannot be proscribed 
or avoided by the use of specious or fallacious arguments. More 
particularly because thus individuals may be misled when forming 
their conscience, and coaction, the necessary property of a 
strict right, is altogether condemned between nations or at leas 
denied to those most likely to use it for its intended purpose. 
Realization of these facts has found clear expression in an 
article by Father Joseph Keating,S.J., who despite his repeated 
pronouncements against war has these statements to make: 
It seems paradoxical to say ••• t~~t the chief moral 
principle which seems in danger of being obscured 
is the right of self-defense, inherent both in the 
individual and in the community. But so it seems. 
The very belligerency taught by dictators and too 
readily assimilated in the still democratic coun-
tries, has aroused a corres-ponding reaction, and 
over against the 'Prussian' doctrine that aggression 
is always lawful, we find the other extreme that re-
sistance to aggression is never right. 1 
Further on in the article he notes that: 
It may be that more harm is done by genuine advocates 
of peace, whose advocacy reposes on emotion instead 
of reason, or on a sincere though mistaken interpreta-
tion of Christian teaching. 2 
With these preliminary cautions prefixed we can now turn to 
the subject of war proper. War, properly so called, as opposed t< 
revolution, or private acts of hostility, is defined by Suarez a~ 
an external struggle between two rulers or two countries. 
Pugna exterior, quae exteriori paci repugnat, tunc 
proprie bellum dicitur, quando est inter duos prin-
cipes, vel duas respublicas. 3 
To cover all modern contingencies the Ethics Committee of the 
6 
catholic Association for International Peace defines war in its 
juridical sense as: 
••• a contest carried on by force of arms or other 
instruments of death or injury between two or more 
independent and sovereign states, or con~unities 
having in this regard the right of states, under 
the authority of their respective governments even 
though these latter be only provisional.4 
This definition is in its turn a more amplified and definite 
expression of the one given by Father Macksey, S.J. in the 
Catholic Encyclopedia.5 
The modifications concerning the moral rights enjoyed by 
the belligerents and the authority competent to declare war 
introduced into the definition by the Committee apparently in-
elude struggles which prima facie seem to be relegated by Suarez 
to revolution or sedition and not properly included under war, 
as for exrunple the American Revolution and the Civil War. Still 
the Committee also wishes to exclude revolutions and insurrectio s 
from war. It merely recognizes that some revolutions should 
properly be called war. For such recognition it requires that: 
the armed forces must represent a considerable por-
tion of a country's population and that the govern-
ment under which they act and to which they are res-
ponsible, must be so organized as to be in a position 
to meet the duties necessarily inc1unbent upon belli-
gerents, viz., to maintain law and order within the 
regions subjected to their control and to conduct war 
on a large scale by land and sea. Given this requis-
ite minimum, we can speak of war; in its absence, the 
uprising must be considered a rebellion and nothing 
more.6 
Still, when Suarez comes to treat of revolution he speaks of it 
as of w~r and subjects it to the same moral principles, so that 
mutatis mutandis the two concepts are practically identical: 
Bellum reipublicae contra princlpem, etiam si sit 
aggressivum, non est intrinsece malum; habere tamen 
debet conditiones justi alias belli, ut honestetur. 
Conclusio solUJn habet locum, quando princeps est 
tyrannus.7 
On only one point is there disagreement: Suarez's inclu-
7 
sion of revolution is limited to a justified revolt, while the 
other definition does not specifically mention this moral consid 
eration. 
Later on in the discussion the elements of these definition 
and their implications will be treated more fully. Here the 
writer wishes only to point out some differences in the usage of 
the term war to preclude any subsequent confusion. 
War is frequently referred to as e.g., "an appalling evil," 
"a scourge worse than plague or famine,"9 "the chief weapon of 
the Prince of Darkness in his age-long campaign against light, 
goodness, beauty, against God and man;"lO or it is condemned as 
an instrument used for political or economic domination. This 
usage of the word is corr~on to everyday life and may be called 
war in its physical aspects. 
There is, however, another, and for the moralist an essenti 
ally different aspect of war-- the moral aspect. Considered thu 
war is a species of coercion, the property of a moral right. In 
this sense war is not "an appalling evil" or "a scourge," nor 
an instrument for domination. These consequents ~y accompany 
or result from war, but they are not the moral constituents of 
war. War is rather a means, necessary under certain circum-
stances, of making law effective. \~en, therefore, anything 
is said about the nature of war, about its licitness, about the 
acts permissible during war, or about the causes justifying a 
war, there will always be question of war as a property or a 
complement of a strict moral right. 
Another point on the usage of words may profitably be con-
sidered: not infrequently the adjective modern seems to be 
synonymous with unjust when used of war. Thus Donald Attwater 
says, "it looks as if modern war, in the full sense of the ex-
pression, is in itself irrational, unlawful, sinful."ll So, too 
we read: 
Since 1914 there has been an ever-widening flood of 
questioning whether the rational man, ~ fortiori the 
Christian man, can take part in the thing called mod-
ern war, without betraying himself and his faith: 
whether, in fact, war has not become something in 
essence different from what it was in the past ••• 12 
Now there is no doubt that war, wherever or whenever fought, 
has, de facto, brought in its train ~oral evil and lawlessness; 
nor that war today --modern war-- needs a graver cause to justif 
it and does occasion more widespread havoc morally and physicall 
than past wars. Still, these facts plus the concession that 
many modern wars may have been unjust do not justify one in 
identifying modern war with unjust war. Recent wars may have 
been unjust and modern, but not unjust because modern. 
Even when we admit, for the sake of argmaent, with such 
authors that the means used in modern warfare justify the iden-
tification of modern and unjust, a difficulty presents itself. 
, 
The fact that such illicit means have as a matter of fact been 
used does not of itself permit us to infer, as these authors do, 
that they must be used. Father Keating,S.J., for example, says 
that: 
One of the strongest arguments against war is that it 
necessitates a systematic spreading of falsehood in 
order to circumvent the enemy. The enemy must be painted 
absolutely black and accused of every imaginable cruelty, 
as a monster outside the pale of human consideration. 
If this is not done the hateful work of killing and be-
ing killed would be impossible. 13 
(Italics added). 
The necessity of resorting to such evil means seems jus't as 
I 
likely to be treaceable to other sources; if it is not,the con-
elusion that such means are necessary would apply to any war, an 
cient, medieval or modern, since killing is always the same 
"hateful work". Is not the employment of such means necessitated 
by the fact that the soldiers are frequently not aware_of the 
cause for which they are fighting. Or if aware of it, may the 
cause of war not have been disproportionate, vague, or only a 
blind for ulterior and illicit objectives? Thus we have no in-
trinsic necessity arising from modern war, but an extrinsic, il-
le.gi tima te necessity arising from a failure to verify some other 
requisite for a just war. 
The real reason for making anything of so trivial a matter 
as incautious use of words is that it would in this particular 
instance, if taken strictly, degrade coaction, the last legit!-
mate resource of a government i:p. case of extreme necessity, from 
a moral function to an immoral and hence forbidden measure. Fur-
ther, it would 'deny the use of it, as mentioned before, to those 
10 
who in the nature of the case alone would be likely to use it 
legitimately. Consequently, any attempt to introduce the theory 
that might nmke right could not be frustrated by the one convinc 
ing argument for such proponents: the paradoxical use of might 
to establish the claims of right. 
Another reason for taking exception to such expressions is 
that they may well be the occasion of worry and concern on the 
part of numerous individuals. Confronted with a duty to society 
on the one hand, and these expressions on the other, they may 
well be led by the excitement or fear of the moment to act with 
a doubtful conscience. This can hardly be considered desirable, 
especially since the deterrent to action would, in the case 
given, be objectively unfounded. 
There is one problem extremely perplexing, which must at 
least be mentioned before going further. Since it presents itsel 
not only when discussing the means employed (which condition is 
beyond the scope of this paper as far as detailed develop1nent is 
concerned), but insinuates itself into other phases of war as 
well, it is deemed best to introduce it here. It is the question 
of the divisibilit1 or indivisibility of war into a plurality of 
of moral acts. Does war constiture only one moral act or many? 
If only one, then every infraction of morality intrinsically in-
cluded in that act, whether it continues throughout the act or 
surreptitiously creeps in later, or is permitted only temporaril , 
would vitiate the entire act. For the morality of an act is de-
te~ained by all its components. And the axiom, bonum~ in~esra 
II 
causa, malum.ex guocumgue defectu, applies to war as well as any 
other moral entity. 
Strict unicity or indivisibility can, then, hardly be main-
tained. It would expose,for example, the justice or morality of 
an entire nation's undertaking to the indiscretion or even open 
injustice of any one of its members. 
And yet to delineate clearly and accurately just how war is 
divisible or constitutes a plurality of acts is a very hazardous 
undertaking. Father Vann, for example, queries 
whether one can repudiate this or that part of a 
general policy, or whether the policy is'indivisible' 
in the sense that any of its elements must be held 
to affect the whole conduct of the war. 14 
And again: 
Can we hold, for example, that the killing directa 
intentione of the civil population is a crime re-
stricted to a particular section of the fighting 
forces; and that therefore service in other sections 
can still be licit? Or must we say that any service 
whatsoever is at least a ~ormal cooperation in the 
crime? 15 · 
The author of these excerpts hesitates to give any answers 
and professes only to "suggest lines of consideration--leaving 
them in the form of questions rather than in the form of dogmati 
asseri;;ions."l6 
Faced by such sincere diffidence the writer wishes only to 
suge;est some norms according to which he thinks an answer may be 
·formulated. 
First of all let us consider the war objectively, that is, 
its justice or injustice in itself independently of the subjecti e 
evaluation given it by any individual taking part in it. Suppose 
IZ. 
the government conducting the war has verified the conditions 
for a just war-- the cause is just, the intention good, the mean 
intended licit. Such a war at its inception would be just, nor 
could anything done later vitiate this initial justness. But let 
us now suppose that as the war progresses the govern..-rnent ~ .. such 
were to change its intention, so that it now plarilled the utter 
defeat and hmniliation of the enemy even though this was unneces 
sary and disproportionate to the wrongs committed, or that it 
commanded the use of intrinsically evil means in whatsoever 
branch of the service. Surely this change of policy could not 
vitiate the initial policy since then it did not enter into the 
plans;and just as surely the war is, under this cl~ge of policy 
and so far as this policy is included, no longer just. 
Here we can, it seems, consider such a change as constitut-
ing a new moral act--an unjust phase of the war. Were s~ch a 
policy to predominate even after a just inception, the war would 
be unjust simpliciter, and just only secundumguid (relative to 
the conditions at the inception). Were such a deviation on the 
other hand, to comprehe,nd only incidental and temporary injustic , 
the war would be just as a whole, and unjust only with 
these incidents. 
If, however, at the inception of the war the goverruuent 
positively included in its policy the use of evil means, or had 
no just·cause for war, then the entire war would be immoral, eve 
though many individual phases would in themaelves be ~gitimate. 
Thus we may say in general that some phases of a just war may be 
I 3 
unjust without vitiating the entire war, unless they should be i 
excess of the just; but that the phas~of an initially immoral 
war cannot be moral because of the unjust whole to which they ar 
subordinated. 
The above considerations refer only to policies adopted by 
the highest authority--the government; for it is on its authorit 
and in accordance with its policy that the entire war is under-
taken. 
If, however, we consider war from the viev~oint of the in-
dividuals taking part in it, that is, the subjective moral evalu -
tion given it by them, other norms must be suggested, it seems. 
In general it can be said that it would be extremely difficult 
for an individual to determine for himself whether any particula 
policy or practice observed were sponsored by the highest author -
ties or not. If he were able to establish as morally certain tha 
the government ~ such had determined as a standing policy to us 
any means --good or bad-- he could hardly participate. If he cou d 
not do so, he would be obliged, it seems, to give the government 
the benefit of the doubt and could hardly refuse service just be 
cause he witnessed or heard of such illicit actions. Still, if h 
personally were ordered to execute such an intrinsically evil ac 
tion, he would have to refuse, provided of course that he were 
certain the act was illicit. In case of serious doubt, he would 
again be permitted to form his conscience aided by the clear and 
certain principle that legitimate authority must be obeyed. 
With these gen~ral introductory remarks prefaced we can 
go on to more detailed consideration of the traditional doctrine 
of war. 
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II 
WAR AND SO~lli OF ITS PROBLEMS 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine some of the prob-
lems arising from the concept of war under present day circum-
stances. This will necessitate an exposition, in Part One, of 
the traditional scholastic doctrine on war minus such aspects as 
no longer apply to contemporary conditions. Special attention 
is given to the types of war and the just cause of war, together 
with its implications, in Part Two. 
In scope, this thesis confines itself in its detailed de-
velopment to the problems arising from the just cause and a dis-
cussion of the types of war. The question of legitimate author-
ity, the means employed, and numerous other implicated problems 
are either considered outside the range of the thesis or are ad-
verted to briefly in Part One, where the conditions as laid 
down by the scr1olastics are reviewed. 
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PART ONE 
THE TRADITIONAL SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE ON WAR 
Beginning with the early Doctors of the Church there are 
to be found expressions of opinion on war. As time went on, 
these expressions accumulated and gave rise to a traditional 
attitude. The texts of St. Augustine, for example, were codified 
and included in the Decretum Gratiani, a summary of Canon Law. 
st. Thomas, to a great extent, drew from this source and gave it 
methodical and concise expression in the second part of his 
s~~a Theologica. With the discovery of the New World and its 
resulting wars of conquest, the question of war again came up 
for special analysis by Spanish theologians. Chief among these 
were :i''rancis de Vittoria, O.P. and J:'rancis Suarez, S.J. Both 
wrote a work on war: Vittoria, De Jure Belli, and Suarez, the 
thirteenth disputation in his tractate on Charity. The former's 
works are to a great extent the practical solutions given to 
contemporary problems as they arose. Suarez, on the other hand, 
took a more philosophical approach and developed a general doc-
trine on war. 
~ ------------------------------------------------------~,-,~ 
CHAPTER 1 
THE NATURE AND E1~ OF WAR 
Since this thesis undertakes to examine war as an ethical 
entity ratner than as a physical fact, it will be necessary to 
examine i.ts juridical origin and nature. Thus considered, the 
strategy employed and the other factors involved in waging a 
war are a propos to our approach only insofar as they have a 
moral character, i.e., insofar as they are licit or illicit 
means. 
War, by definition, is an armed conflict between two inde-
pendent states. Consequently, its origin, nature, and end will 
be determined by the nature and end of the state. For this 
reason, we will have to give an exposition of the state, at 
least as much as is necessary to understand war. 
Moreover, any inquisition into the licitness of war as such 
will also depend in its turn on the nature of the state, for, as 
Father Nivard, S.J. puts it: 
Sicut norma rectitudinls actus humani ab individuo 
elicita, est natura individui, sic norma rectitudinis 
actus socialis est natura societatis. 1. 
War is evidently a social act, that is, an act undertaken 
by man considered as a member of society. For it is one society 
(or state) in conflict with another juridically equal unit. 
The commonly accepted idea of the state is that of a stable 
multitude of people united under some kind of independent rule 
for the purpose of furnishing what is sufficient for a full life: 
Coetus stabilis hominum sub aliquo regl-:nine .independenti 
perfectae vitae sufficientiae causa sociatus.2 
But such a concept gfuves only a de facto description withou 
any intimation of the state's juridical status. From it we can-
not tell whether it be a natural society, i.e., one wi1ose spec-
ific essence is determined by nature and vvhose existence is at 
least morally necessitated;3 or whether it be only a positive, 
free associe.tion whose essence depends upon the free choice of 
its constituents. 
Building upon the foundation laid down by Aristotle when he 
described man as a political animal, and the state as one of 
those societies that originated by nature,4 the Scholastics 
unanimously taught the natural necessity of the existence of the 
state to be deducible from the insufficiency and perfectibility 
of the individual man. St. Thomas, for example, in the third 
book of the Contra Gentes says: 
Homo est naturaliter animal politicurn vel sociale; 
quod qvidem ex hoc apparet quod unus homo non suf-
ficiat sibi, si solus vivat, propterea quod natura 
in paucis homini praevidit sufficienter, dans ei 
rationem per quam possit sibi necessaria ad vitam 
praeparare, sicut cibum, indumenta, et alia ~ujus­
modi, ad quae omnia operanda sufficit non unus homo; 
unde naturaliter inditum est hornini ut in societate 
vivat.5 
In his opusculum De Regimi~. Principum, after repeating 
much tl1.e same line of ergtunent as above, he adds man's speech 
as a further proof of the point: 
Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per hoc, quod est 
proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam unus homo 
allis suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere.6 
~------------------------------------~~ 
- lO 
Having revealed man's insufficiency of himself and his 
desire to associate with his kind, St. Thomas advances a step 
and shows that these two inherent characteristics necessitate 
some form of authority to coordinate the activities of the 
individual with the common good. 
Si ergo naturale est homini quod in societate 
multorum vivat, necesse est in hominibus esse per 
quod multitude regatur. Multis enim existentibus 
hominibus et unoquoque id, q~od est sibi congruum, 
providente, multitude in diversa dispergeretur, 
nisi etiam esset aliquis de eo, quod 'd bonum 
multitudinis pertinet, curam habens. • 
Suarez's argument comes to the same, though the point of 
departure is somewhat different. Starting with the question 
whether the power to make laws c~~ reside in men (which can be 
doubted, he says, since man is free by nature and subject only 
to God), he shows the natural necessity of such a prerogative. 8 · 
But the concept of the state would not be complete unless 
consideration were given to that most important element, the end 
of the state. Whether the end of the state be determined by 
nature or by man is a question that is already answered as soon 
as one has determined whether the state is a natural or a posi-
tive institution. For nature would not have a predetermined end 
for an institution which is created by man alone; nor, on the 
other hand, would it demand such an institution without having 
an end or purpose in view. 
Aber da er (der Stadt) eine in der Natur des 
Menschen nothwendig begrUndete und vom Urheber 
derselben gewollte Anstalt ist, so muss er auch, 
wie alle naturlichen Anstalten, einen von Natur 
aus bestimmten Zweck haben •••• Gott konnte den 
~------------------------------------------~l~l 
Staat nicht wollen, olme ilm zu einem bestimmten 
Zweck zu wollen. Und dieser Zwack muss durch die 
Natur selbst vorgezeichnet sein, da der Staat eine 
naturliche Gemeinsshaft ist. 9. 
This end will naturally be identical for all states as such 
since all have the same juridical origin and all men (for whom 
they exist) have the same needs and capacities. Therefore, the 
doctrine of Montesquieu that states have only one end in common; 
self preservation, and determine their own particular ends, is 
inadequate, and grossly mistakes means for ends. 
Quoique tous les etats ayent en·general un meme 
objet, qui est de se maintenir, chaque etat en a por-
tant un qui lui est particulier. L 1aggrandissement 
etait l'~Bjet de Rome, la querre celui de Lacede-
mone... • 
In ~ddition to being inadequate, however, it altogether 
misses the point in question, for we are looking for an end 
proper to the state, an end which distinguishes it from other 
societies, and not a characteristic which is co®non to every 
being. 
The true end of the state as understood and explained by 
the Scholastics seems self-evident, at least in its general 
aspects. Since man as an individual has God as his personal, 
final end, which prerogative endows him with duties and corres-
pending inviolable rights, and since this same man needs the 
state for the perfect realization of his capacities, it is evi-
dent that the state has man for its end -- it is the means 
ordained by the Author of nature to provide those aids, conven-
iences, and protection which man, of himself, cannot provide. 
In other words, the state is for the good of its members: 
~------------------------------------------------------------1l~l 
addo ••• eius (potestatis civilis) finem esse 
felicitatem naturalem communitatis humanae perfectae, 
cuius curam gerit, et singulorum hominum ut aunt 
membra talis co~nunitatis, ut in ea, scilicet in 
pace et justitia vivant, et cum sufficientia 
bonorum quae ad vitae corporalis conservationem 
et commoditatem spectant, et cum ea probitate morum 
quae ad hanc externam pacem et felicitatem rei-
publicae, et convenientem h~~ae naturae con-
servationem necessaria est. • 
The exact determination of the state's prerogatives and 
duties need not detain us here. The point of importance for us 
is that the state, as described, is a natural institution 
ordained by the Author of nature to aid man. 
By reason of the unity realized in the formation of the 
state under a legitimate authority, a new moral enti•ty comes 
into being. Since it is in accordance with God's will, as 
mirrored in the objective, final order of creation, it must also 
have by this sa..'Tl'le will the moral rights necessary to fulfill its 
functions and obligations, for, according to the scholastic 
dictum, also conceded by others, natura nil fecit frustra. The 
state has, therefore, rights· sufficient and proportionate to its 
purposes; and these rights are natural, i.e., valid independentl 
of any positive, free enactment on the part of man. 
Now a right, an inviolable moral claim, is a means, and has 
f 12. or its end some personal good. Thus each state, as a sov-
ereign moral personality, has rights which similar societies are 
obliged by the natural law to respect. From such corresponding 
relationaships there originates a natural juridical order among 
nations. Father Nivard in his Ethica thus proves the existence 
of a natural juridical order between nations: 
Deus necessaria (supposita creatione) vult adesse 
civitates et relationes inter eas, hinc etiam ea 
quae relationes istae exigunt. 
Atqui istae relationes exigunt inter civitates 
vigere quaedam jura et officia iam ex lege naturali 
determinata. Ergo existit ordo juridica inter 
gentes. 13. -
We may take Timothy Brosnahan's list of duties and rights 
to get some idea of the main features of the juridic~l order: 
The primary duty of a nation toward other nations 
is to treat them with benevolence, respect, and 
justice due to an equal sovereign personality. Its 
primary rights are the rights of self-preservation, 
of self-development, of independence and self control, 
of territorial dominion and of r~ice in..matters affec-
ting the community of nations. • 
Now these rights, being strictly juridical, carry with them 
coaction, that moral property in virtue of which the subject 
enjoying them may use physical force to necessitate their respec 
ful recognition by others. 
Here, then, we have the moral nature of war: it is the 
property of a strict moral right conceded by the natural law and 
is found in each independent state. But the actual exercise of 
coercion, limited as it already is in the instance of individual 1 
is even more restricted when there is question of the state. 
The qualifying conditions, however, will be considered in the 
following chapter. For the present it will suffice to show that 
war has always been considered a natural right by the Scholastics 
For illustration we will quote St. Thomas, St. Robert Bellarmine, 
and Suarez. 
In article forty of the Secunda Secundae, where he treats of 
war, St. Thomas says: 
~----------------------------------------------------------~~~~~ 
I 
Cum autem cura rei publicae comissa: sit principibus, 
ad eos pertinet rem publica~ civitatis ••• sibi sub-
ditae tueri. Et sicut licite defendunt eam materiali 
gladio contra interiores perturbatores, dum malefac-
tores puniunt, ••• ita etiam gladio ballico ad eos 5 pertinet rem publicam ab exterioribus hostibus tueri. 1 • 
He likewise quotes St. Augustine in confirmation to the effect 
that: 
ordo naturalis mortalium accomodatus hoc poscit, ut 
suscipiendi belli austoritas atque consilium penes 
principes sit. 16. 
Cardinal Bellarmine gives substantially the same reply in 
answer to an apparent contradiction between the right to wage 
war and some texts from Scripture. The part pertinent to our 
question alone is quoted: 
••• ergo etiam licebit bello atque armis, quando alia 
via non potest, defendere eosdem suos elves ab hosti-
bus externis: quia ut possint conservari respublicae, 
necessarium est omnes hostes, tam internes quam exter-
nos, arcere possint; et cum hoc sit jus naturae, :[lfllo 
modo c redibile est per evangelium esse sublatum. • 
Vvhen, however, we come to Suarez 1 s doctrine on this point, 
the issue is not so clear at first sight. The question comes up 
in two distinct treatises; the De Bello and the De Jure Gentium; 
the first unequivocally says that the right to wage war is 
granted the supreme ruler by natural law, whereas the second 
seems to accord the ruler this right only by reason of the Jus 
Gentium which according to Suarez is positive human law. 
Before attempting to reconcile these two statements, let us 
first note the pertinent passages from the two works. In the Jus 
Gentium he says: 
Idem censeo de .iure belli: quatenus fundatur in 
~------------------------------------------------------------~~~$ 
potestate quam respublica vel monarchia suprema habet 
ad puniendam vel vindicandam, aut reparandam iniuriam 
sibi ab altera illatam, videtur proprie esse de iure 
gentium. Nam ex vi solius rationis naturalis non erat 
necessarium ut haec potestas esset in republica 
offensa: potuissent enim homines instituere alium 
modum vindictae, vel co~nittere illam potestatem ali-
cui tertia princip:t, et quasi arbitrio cum potestate 
coactiva; tamen quia hie modus, qui nunc servatur, 
facilior est, magisque naturae consentaneus, usu intra-
ductus est, et ita iustus, ut non possit illi lure 
resisti.l8 
The passage from the treatise De Bello, on the other hand, 
runs thus: 
Quaestio est de bello aggressive: nam potestas se 
defendendi ab iniusto invasore penes omnes datur. 
Dico prime: supremus princeps qui in temporalibus 
superiorem non habet, vel respublica quae similem 
iurisdictionem apud se retinuit, habet iure naturae 
potestatem legitimam indicendi bellum.l9 
The apparent difficulty, I think, can be cleared up by mak-
ing a distinction between ius absolute spectatum ad bellum and 
ius alicuius determinati hominis ad bellum. Now the ius absolute 
spectatum is never denied to be of the natural law, whereas the 
ius alicuius determinati hominis is said in the first passage 
to be of the Ius Gentium, in the second, of the Ius Naturale for 
this reason: war, since there are so many and such grave evils 
that accompany it, must be avoided as much as possible. Con-
sequently, it can only be resorted to when all other means have 
failed. Therefore, it can reside with absolute necessity only in 
the absolutely supreme ruler. Now, in the first passage, Suarez 
is considering the absolute necessity of such a right in the 
individual rulers of perfect states, while at the same time pre-
~--------------------------------------------------------~Z~6 
scinding from the actual organization of nations. From this 
point of view the individual ruler does not necessarily enjoy it, 
for, as he mentions, the right could have been entrusted to an 
arbitrator with coercive power. In that case the ius absolute 
~~atum, had from the natural law, would have been so restrict-
ed as to reside only in the arbitrator and not in the heads of 
the individual states. For the arbitrator would be, by this 
arrangement, the only supreme ruler among the three rulers in 
question, whereas the other two rulers would be supreme only 
secundum quid and would have in the arbitrator a superior to 
whom they could appeal. Consequently, their jurisdiction would 
no longer be supreme nor could they declare war legitimately. 
Since, however, custom, so to speak, decreed against the estab-
lishment of such an arbitrator, it thereby necessarily invested 
the individual heads of state with the right. Thus considered, 
the right of individual rulers has been determined by Ius Gentium. 
In the second passage, however, in which the right to war 
is said to reside in the individual ruler by natural law, Suarez 
does not consider who enjoys the right by absolute necessity, 
but rather who enjoys it be de facto necessity. That is, he now 
prescinds from the abstract possibility of another arrangement 
of states and only views the natural right to war under existing 
circumstances and finds that it resides necessarily in each 
indj_vidual ruler; and, since necessarily, by the natural law. 
The reason it resides necessarily in the individual ruler when 
thus considered is because de facto such a ruler has then no 
~--------------------------------------------------------~Z~1n 
Sllperior to whom he may appeal; every avenue that might preclude 
war is thus closed and he must vindicate his own rights. 
This attempt at reconciliation seems to be borne out when 
we consider that only a ruler who has no superior in temporal 
affairs can legitimately exercise what I have termed the ius 
absolute spectatum. For in Section 4, n.5, of the De Bello 
he says: 
Haec autem potestas non est in aliquo superiore, quia 
nullum habent, ut ponimus.20 (italics added.) 
This seems to indicate that here he is not considering the 
absolute possibility of another arrangement, but the actual con-
dition confronting him in his day as it does us in ours. And so 
he can consistently continue: 
Ergo necesse est, ut sit (haec potestas) in 
s·upremo principe rei publicae laesae. 21 
From the above analysis it is evident that war is not "the 
outcome of the growth of societies,"22 as the Encyclopedia 
Britannica is pleased to consider it in accordance with its avow-
ed evolutionary outlook. War·may de facto have been occasioned 
by such phenomena, but such a view is purely historical and gives 
o insight into war's juridical nature. Neither is war "the 
lood and iron cure for weakness and idleness,"23 as Father 
Stratmann expresses the theory propounded before the World War. 
In examining the nature of war we have already to a great 
extent, at least hnplicitly, seen its true end or purpose. It is 
evidently not intended as a means to secure empire, to subjugate 
other independent states, or to maintain an arbitrary, and 
~ l 
' frequently i:!nposed, status quo; neither is it intended as a 
safety valve when domestic conditions threaten internal trouble. 
war undertaken with such ends in view is branded by St. Augustin 
as brigandry on a laree scale: 
Inferre autem bellQm finitimis, et inde in caetera 
procedere, ac populos sibi non molestos sola regni 
cupiditas conterere et subdere, quid aliud quam 
grande latrocinium nominandum est?24 
The reason for condemning wars undertaken for such purposes 
is clear in view of war's nature: coaction. It is intended as 
the last effective means of guarding actually ·possessed moral 
rights or regaining the matter of such rights which in the given 
instances are altogether lacking. 
Suarez uses this fact as a norm according to which one can 
determine the denands licit after victory: 
Post partam victoriam, licitum est principi ea drunna 
inferre reipublicae victae, quae sufficiunt ad iustam 
vindictam, et satisfactionem et restitutionem onmiQ'll 
damnorum. Conclusio (haec) est com:nunis, et certa, ... 
~1ia hie est finis belli ... 25 
For the most part, however, the Scholastics, beginning from 
St. Augustine, use the term peace when speaking of the end or 
purpose of war. But this really says the same thing, though it 
includes at the same ti~e all those social benefits and conditio 
for whose preservation and maintenance rights were accorded to 
states. Suarez, in fact, even describes war as a "quasi via ad 
pacem."26 And in another place he goes so far as to say that 
peace is the c[li ef end of war. But it is to be observed that it 
is to preserve and foster peace, an i~possible feat unless rights 
are respected; peace can only be real when based on justice •.• 
rr:------~,f 
~ax opus iustitiae: 
.r:---
Denique potest peti (a republica victa) iuste quidquid 
in futurum necessarium videtur ad conservandam pacem, 
atque etiarn tuendain, quia hie est finis praeciput.,;.s 
belli, pacem statuere in futur~~.27 
That the Scholastics, one and all, mean a true, genuine 
peace based on justice and not on impotence is evident from the 
general trend of their thought. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine, pro-
posing to himself the difficulty that war, rather than bring 
peace, violates it says: 
Bellum sic paci opponitur, ut sit etiam medium ad 
pacem, sed hoc interesse inter bellUFl justur:1 et in-
justum, quod bellum inj1:stu.'t. o:pponi tur paci bonae, 
et ducit ad pacem ma.lam, et ideo tale bellum viti-
osum est: at bellum justum opponitur paci malae, et 
ducit ad pacem bonam.28 
From the nature of war, then, as the property of coaction 
inherent in the natural moral right granted by God to safeguard 
the social relationships between sovereign nations, we have seen 
that its purpose is to preclude the unscrupulous from flouting 
inviolable moral rights. Paradoxically enough, God has thus 
provided that might shall not be right, by ordaining that right 
may use might to second its claim. A prerogative fraught with 
so many tempting possibilities of abuse, however, nust be hedged 
in by conditions and restrictions. These, therefore, will be 
considered in the following chapter. 
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' NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
1. Nivard, Marcellus, S.J., Ethica. P. 319. 
2. Donat, J., S.J., Ethica Specialis. p. 122. 
3. Ibid., p. 87. 
4. Aristotle, Politics. I. 2,6.1253. 
5. St. Thomas, Contra Gentes. Bk. III, c. 85. 
6. St. Thomas, De Regimine Princip1.Un._ Bk. I, c.l. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Suarez, Francis, S.J., V, De Legibus. Ek. III, c.l. 
9. Cathrein, Victor, S.J., Moralphilosophie. 5th ed., II, p.507. 
10. Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Bk. II, c.5., (as quoted by 
Cathrein, op. cit:;-vor:-II, p. 507.) 
11. Suarez, Francis, S.J., De Legibus. Bk. III, c.ll, n.7. 
12. Leibell, J.F., Readings in Ethics, p. 405. 
13. Nivard, Marcellus, S.J., op. cit., p. 405. 
14. 3rosnahan, Timothy, Digests of Lectures on Ethics. (as 
edited by J.F. Leibel! in~eadings in~tnics,) p. 1016. 
15. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica. II IIae, 2. 40, a.l. 
16. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum. Lib., L~II, c.75. 
17. Cardinal Bellarmine, De Laicis. Lib. III, c.XIV. 
18. Suarez, Francis, S.J., op. cit., Bk. II, c.l9, n.B. 
19. Suarez, Francis, S.J., XII, Tract. III, ~ Charitate, 
Disp. XIII, De Bello. S.2, n.l. 
20. Ibid., S.4., n.5. 
21. Ibid. 
22, Encyclopedia Er:ttannica. (XIV ed.) XXIII. "War." p. 321. 
~--------------------------------------~3~1 
·23· Stratmann, Franziskus, O.P., Church and~· p. 52. 
24• St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei. Lib. IV, c.6. 
25· suarez, Francis, S.J., op. cit., S.7. n.7. 
Z6. Ibid. S.7. n.20. 
Z7. Ibid. S.7. n.5. 




CONDITTONS FOR A JUST WAR 
In the last chapter we saw that war, considered ethically, 
is a species of coaction whose licitness is bound up in the fact 
that it alone is able at times to induce necessary respect for 
moral rights. V:far is, therefore, no end in itself nor is its 
existence justified by the physical fact of its occurence; it is 
the means to an end. In order that an act be morally just, not 
only must its end be good, but the means employed must be at 
least indifferent. But the means of proper coaction between 
nations, war, is, physically considered and in general, force; 
this latter is held to be indifferent in itself. It derives its 
morality from the end for which it is employed. 
In as far, then, as war, physically viewed, must at least 
be morally indifferent, in so far is its lawfulness a matter of 
primary importance; consequently we must read cautiously such a 
phrase as: 
It is clear that its (war's) own lawfulness is not 
the first consideration; it is only the means to an 
end.l 
Viewed in its immediate context, this statement of Father 
Stratmann evidently does not intend to affirm that the end of 
war, "the preservation or restoration of j~stice," 2 condones the 
use of an evil means. In fact he explicitly condemns that 
Principle elsewhere. And yet, when dealing later on with the 
wars of the Old Testament he seems to concede to God the 
rr;,rerogative of so acting. Such ambiguity might unwittingly 
occasion a misunderstanding not only of the particular problem 
to which he applies it, but to his views of end. and means in 
general. 
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Immediately after affirmin:i, that "God cannot approve of any-
thing immoral even to 2;ain the most holy ends, " 3 he continues: 
It is possible that something in itself wrong may be 
ordered by God for some special object, and in that 
way become right. For instance a child killed by its 
father.4 
He evidently means that God as Aut:-:cor of life and supreme 
Lord of t,ie creatures may licitly command the death of an 
innocent child by its father for a good reason. But with those 
qualifications added the slaying is no longer an act which comes 
under the prohibition of the law. In other words, God can, in 
virtue of being the supreme Guardian of the moral order and 
because of His supreme dominion over his creation, so affect the 
circumstances of an act that it is no lcnger wrong in itself. 
The reason for bringing up thls case is that the same 
author leaves open for misinterpretation a similar statement 
concerning the question of war. He sa.ys: 
That war is an evil, al~ost everyone, certainly every 
Christian, mu~t allow, but the majority considers it 
a necessary evil, to be borne as something that 
cannot be avoided. 5 
Here again the ambiguity consequent on using the word'evil' as 
a modifier of war mie;ht lead to the misunderst~:-,ndin,~: that evil 
may be permitted if good comes out of it; for later on the 
author- defends the use of such an 'evil' means as "allo.rratle by 
It were safer, then, to avoid saying that war's 
lawfulness is not the first consideration, and insist that it 
must at least be morally indifferent. 
But even after attempting to free war as such from evils 
intrinsic to it, we must aQmit that evils, both phJsical and 
moral, do follow it. These evils alone would be reason enough 
for hedging the declaration of a just war around with conditions. 
suarez also makes mention of these evils as a reason for demand-
ing numerous conditions before war can be justlfied: 
Ratio vero conclusionis generalis est, quia licet 
bell~~ per se non sit malum, tamen propter rnulta 
incomrnoda quae secmn affert, ex iis negotiis est 
quae saepe male fiunt. Et ideo etiam multis 
indi,,::;et circumstantiis ut ~onestetur. "7 
In addition to this, all rights, but partic~.llarly the right 
of coercion, have limitations arising especially from the 
purpose for ivhich the ri,-~hts were conferred. 
Thus a treatment of the conditions sine qua ~ for the 
legitimate use of the right to wage war is not a procedure 
eculiar to war, though it has, perhaps, received more lengthy 
consideration by the Scholastics than the circumstances which 
ondition other rights. For the p·urposes of this chapter we 
ill consult Suarez in particular. In him we have at once a 
ownentator on st. Thomas' principles as well as a philosopher's 
resentation and development of the practical conclusions 
rrived at by some of his contemporaries in answer to the 
qmstions raised by Spain's relationships to the New World. 
In addition to examinin;; these condi ttons as laid do·wn by 
suarez for his day, an atte.-;1pt will be made to supplement them 
in the light of modern circumstances and also to review the 
expressions of' some modern C<-J.th.olic writers on these conditions. 
The fir~t condition, mentioned as a requisite fro~ the time 
of st. Au~~ustine, is that war be undertaken only on the initiativE 
of the supreme authority. 
Ordo naturalis hoc poscit, ut suscip:I.endi belli 
auctoritas atque consilium penes principes sit.8 
suarez in his turn req·uires fulfillment of this same condition, 
giving the following reasons: 
Ratio est, prir:o, qu:I.a hoc bellU!lf (aggresslvum), ut 
ostendimus, interdum licet jure naturae; ergo oportet 
potestatem illud indicendi esse apud aliquem; ergo 
maxime apud habentem supremam potestatem; nam ad eum 
maxime spectat tueri rem publicam, imperareque infer-
ioribus prlncipibus. Secunda, quia potestas indicendi 
bellum est quaeda.mp otestas jurisdictionis ••• 9 
This first condition offered considerable diffic1~ty in the 
days when small states were neither wholly dependent nor wholly 
independent. For the most part such condi tl ons do not prevail 
today. 
And yet an analogous situation may well arise, and has, 
accordinf!; to some, already arisen because of the establishment 
of international tribunals. H. A. Jules-Bois, for exa~ple, in 
an article entitled, "St. Thomas on War," written as late as 
1936, says: 
Since war has unanimously been placed outside the 
law, the various peoples anJ their leaders have no 
longer the right legally to embark on an armed 
aggression, one against the other. 11 10 
so, too, does Donald Attwater maintain that: 
If a country binds itself, for example, by the 
covenant of the League of Nations or tne Kellogg-
Briand pact, to seek and accept arbitration, 
machinery for such arbitration being avail~ble and 
then refuses to seek or accept it, that country stands 
self-condernned."ll 
The instrument by means of which this restriction was accomp-
listed is said by him to have been the Kellog[\"-Briand pact to 
outlaw war. Ti-:18 t the nations of the world can and perLaps 
J6 
should cede their right to war in some such manner is true, but 
that the Kelloge:;-Briand pact was understood thus by its 
signatories is hardly a likely conclusion; to maintain such an 
opinion today in the face o.f its utter impotence would almost 
be foolhardy. Concerning the Kellogg-Briand pact Carlton 
Hayes says in his Modern History: 
••• and with a great flourish was signed at Paris in 
Au;:sust, 1928; the so-called Kellogg-Briand pact. 
Being but a pious declaration, it was speedily adhered 
to by almost every nation. What it really amounted to 
was indicated by t~e ironic fact that its ratificRtion 
by the"United States' Senate was accompanied by the 
enactment of a bill materially increasing the strength 
of the American navy.l2 
And the pact carried the name of two Americans! Surely not one 
of the signatory nations thought itself reduced to the equivalent 
of a 11 persona privata" whic~ could not declare war "quia potest 
jus suum in judicio superioris (i.e., the Lea;;;ue and the Hague 
Tribunal) prosequi. 11 13 
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rrhere is no intention .here of callinc; into question the 
tr'.lth and cogency of the principle underlyinc; Attwater 1 s state-
ment. The only point at issue is that t~e signatories 
apparently never understood the contracts in their literal sense 
or, if they did, subsequent developments showed that the League 
could or would not insure satisfaction with the result that now, 
for all practical purposes, each nation must again act on its 
own initiative. 
As a consequence, the legislative head of each independent 
state must still be reckoned the legitimate authority wherein 
resides t~e power to declare war. Nor is any other internationa 
trP)unal likely to supersede the present arrangement until there 
exists among its sanctions the ultimate weapon of coercion as 
Pope Eenedict XV clearly had provided for in his peace proposals 
The next condition required is the just cause. Owing to 
the number of problems which can arise under· this head, it will 
be better here to mention only some of the seneral character-
istics of the just cause and leave further treatment to a later 
chapter. 
In general we may say with Vittoria that "there is but one 
just cause of war, t:C1e violation of a right."l4 This seems to 
be self-evident wben we recall the purpose of coercion as it is 
understood in Ethics. Whether this violation must be a fait 
~ompli or only an imminent threat will be discussed in the 
following chapter. For the present it is sufficiently clear tha 
a right, a perfect right involving in others an obligation in 
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justice of deference thereto, must be at stake; for coaction, 
war, in this in :tance, is a subsidiary complement of such ric;hts 
to guarantee their inviolability. 
Any such consideration, then, as ambition for empire, an 
increase of prestige, or maintenance of a balance of power 
(probably imposed by arms) is an illegitimate and nugatory 
title to war. First of all no one of these is a legitimate 
right, and secondly, they almost always will entail the 
violation of a strict right enjoyed by another. 
Neither can untoward internal conditions be rated a cause 
of war; even if they were to threaten a revolution which could 
be avoided by diverting attention and energy to foreign enter-
prise. Here asain, there is no ri,:;ht at stake but instead a 
duty to respect others' rights. 
Suarez lists four reasons for requiring a j<1st cause (the 
violation of a right) as a condition for a legiti~ate war: 
Ratio est prima, quia ideo bellum licet, ut res-
publica possi t se indem.."l1.em tueri, alias c·Jntra bonum 
generis humani vergit, propter caedes, ac damna 
fortunarum, etc.; ergo si ea causa cesset, cessabit 
quoque belli justitia. Secundo: in bello spoliantur 
homines propriis bonis, libertate et vita; et haec 
facere sine justa causa est prorsus iniquum ••• 
Tertia, bellum, de quo a1;imus, praecipue aggressivum 
est, et saepe inducitur contra non subditos; unde 
necesse est ut intercedat eorum culpa, ratione cu.ins 
eff:tciantur subditi; alioquin quo. titulo essent digni 
poena, aut subessent alienae jurisdictioni? Tandem 
si illi tituli, seu fines ad quos gentilitas respic-
iebat (ambitio, videlicet, cupiditas, atque etiam 
inanis gloria ••• ) essent liciti et sufficientes, 
unaquaeque respublica posset ad illas aspirare; 
ergo esset bellum ex utraque parte justum per se, et 
sine ignorantia; quod est absurdissimum; duo enim 
contraria jura non possunt esse justa. 11 15 
Of these, the first and t:nird view war specifically as an 
ethical act of coercion which must have justifying reasons 
since the enemy state considered in itself also has a right to 
independence and peace. Its claim to respect can only be for-
Jf 
fei ted b:,- a violati~n on 1 ts part of another state 1 s ri:J:hts. The 
last reason is tel'eological, based on an ordered and hierarchical 
scheme of values in which there can be no genuine, objective 
conflict between the rights of two parties. Either the one has 
no right over the other, or the ri~it of one is subordinate and 
must be ceded in virtue of a higher right in another. The 
second reason has resard for the physical evils of war which, 
when inflicted unnecessarily, are imputable to their perpe-
trators. 
Causes which have traditionally been honored as jL.'St and 
sufficient to warrant defense by war are listed by Suarez under 
three heads: the seizure of territory, refusal to concede 
international rights, serious damage to a nation's honor: 
Secundo advertendum est varia esse injuriarum genera 
pro justi belli causa, quae ad tria capita revocantur. 
Unum, si princeps res alterius occupet ac nolit 
restituere. AlterQ~, si neget communia jura gentium 
sine rationabili causa, ut transitum viarum, commune 
co~nercium, etc. Tertia gravis laesio in fama vel 
honore. 11 16 
Aggression, given as the first just cause, certainly is a 
violation of a perfect right, for it strikes at the very 
existence of the state. In the second case, Suarez is adverting 
to the juridical order that exists between nati::ms as such; each 
sovereign nation as a coordinate unit in the fam:ily of natlons 
bas rights before the other nations of the world which cannot be 
:tgnored without reasonable grounds. These r' ,:-zhts, called by him 
the ordj_nary rL,:hts conferred by the Jus Gentium, are in reality, 
as e~(plained in his elaboration of the Jus Gentium, those which 
are conferred by the natural law and which, he says, belong to 
Jus ,Jentium in the most proper sense of t'l-~a t word.l7 
-
'l'he third sufficient reason mentioned, the deep wounding of 
national honor or good name, presents its own peculiar difficulty 
Of course, if by such a wounding is meant the natural result of 
having violated some other right, there is no difficulty; but 
then it seems no new category of justifying causes but merely a 
subordinate item under his first class of causes. If, on the 
other hand, he means such an action to suffice ratione sui, war 
seems hardly to be an apt means of repairing the injury. For, 
as in the case of the duel, war is unable to restore honor or 
good name. Besides, such a cause could toci easily be claimed by 
both sides and would be open to abuse as the Cetholic Associ-
ation for International Peace points out in its pamphlet on the 
Ethics of War: 
National honor, thou~h ordinarily included among ri3hts 
sui'fic5_ently weighty to justify war if violated, is 
a much abused term. It is intan.::·H:le an'' to a great 
extent purely subjective. Hence, it is an illusory 
element with which to deal. In the past it has 
frequently played the marked role of a handy pretext 
for war at the bidding of scheming politicians. It 
is difficult to see how its violation, without the 
concurrence of other cir;ums,tances, can justify war. "18 
Though honor and good na,11e are not at all purely subjectlve 
creations of themselves, it is true that they can be 
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manipulated as if they were by those with ulter:::or ends in view. 
still the real difficulty against such a cause is the seeming 
ineffectiveness of war to restore honor and good name. Nations 
do need these to fulfil their duties toward their citizens among 
the other nat:ions of the world; but how war can secure them is 
not clear. For all practical purposes, however, we can say that 
their violation will always be accompanied, if not caused, by 
the violation of a strict right. 
Even granting the presence of a just cause for war and its 
declaration by legitimate authority, there still remains the 
question of intention. With what intent does the injured party 
undertake the war? If anything evil be intended, naturally the 
morality of the entire war will be affected. Examples of evil 
intent are given by St. Augustine in his work Contra Faustum: 
Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impaca-
tus atque implacabilis animus., feritas rebellandi, 
libido dominandi, et si qua similia, haec sunt quae 
in bellis j1re culpantur.l9 
It is evident that if such jntentions animate the aggrieved 
party, they are only using their just cause as a means to a bad 
end. 
To the list of Au.·;sustine, St. Robert Bellarmine adds 
increase of empire, or any cause other than the corru.1on good. 20 
St. Thomas and Suarez likewise demand as a requisite for a just 
war a right intent:ion, that is, "qua scilicet intenditur vel 
ut bonum promoveatur, vel ut malum vitetur."21 
When Father Vann comes to comment on t!~is passage, he 
translates vel by and, thus making it necessary for good to be 
promoted in a direct and positive sense. 
A nation resorting to war must, St. Thomas tells us, 
have an intentio recta, a right intention in so do-
ing, 11 i.e. that good be promoted and evil avoided. 1r 
It may be noted that the phrase recta intentio does 
not mean, according to St.Thomas, merely the presence 
of good motives and the absence of evil. There is 
question, in other words, not only of the motive ~~­
hind the war, but also of the outcome of the war. 
Good must certainly somehow be promoted, but to demand that 
this good be over and above the supression of evil- really only 
indirectly a good, seems to ask more than the text warrants and 
more than is ever requisite for tbe legitimate use of coerc:ton. 
He is likewise inclined to interpret the phrase recta in-
tentio so that it will include much more than intention. Despite 
his notation that the phrase meant more to St. Thomas than the 
presence of good and the absence of evil motives, there is no 
indication whatever in the text itself to justify such a remar·k. 
Not that the outcome of the war- the good or ev:tl- may be left 
out of consideration; they may not; but they do not enter into 
the intention. They are rather questions arising under the head 
of the proportion between the evil of a right's violation- the 
cause of war- and the evils likely to ensue if such a violation 
is vindicated by war. 
Cardinal Bellarmine has a special note concerning the right 
intention whlch might at first sight seem to make the presence 
or absence of this condition accidental to the justice of the 




Secunda notandum, differre hanc tertiam conditionem 
a duabus primis, quod illae si e:iesint, faciunt bellum 
esse injust~~, haec vero si desit, facit belltun esse 
malum, sed non injustum proprio. Qui enim sine auc-
toritate vel sine justa caussa bellum movet, non 
solum contra charitatem, sed et!am contra justitiam 
peccat, et non tam est miles, quam latro: qui vero 
auctoritatem et justam caussam habet, et tamen amore 
vindictae vel augendi imperii, vel propter alium 
finem maltun bellat, non agit contra justitiam, sed 
solum contra charitatem, nee est latro, sed malus 
miles.23 
In the passage he surely does not mean to exclude the right 
intention from among the requisites for a just war. He is mere-
ly taking just and unjust in their strict sense, i.e., pertain-
ing strictly to the virtue of justice which inclines one to give 
each his due. Thus, the right intention is not against justice. 
Ordinarily, however, when the scholastics speak of a just or 
unjust war they'mean moral or immoral; and in this sense Cardi-
nal Bellarmine also holds that a war undertaken with an evil 
motive is unjust. His reason for making the distinction here 
is because of the question of restitution which arises. An un-
just war in the strict sense of the word binds the unjust belli-
gerent to restitution; a just but evilly motivated war would 
not. 
Taking intention in a somewhat wider sense so as to include 
what a nation intends to demand as restitution or reparation, it 
seems that the aggrieved nation ought to make public its demands 
at the outset of the war. This procedure would have several 
distinct advantages. It would, first of all, serve as a check 
to later exorbitant and unjust burdens since at the outset of 
war hatred for the enemy and the urge to crush him would not be 
it 
so untractable. Moreover, in the event of an easy victory, the 
victor could not so easily impose such burdens owing to the 
world's knowledge of what had at the outset been intended. Such 
an expression of intention might likewise be conducive to con-
ference and compromise before the war forced them by utterly ex-
hausting the combatants. And, finally, such a declaration would 
Give to the people of the nation some criterion to judge both 
their own stand and the attitude of the enemy, besides letting 
them know exactly why the war was being fought. 
Besides the three conditions mentioned above, Suarez and 
Cardinal Bellarmine fully develop a fourth- the debitus modus. 
Under this head St. Thomas examined only one specific problem, 
that of the use of subterfuge. Since his time, however, this 
condition has presented more and greater problems than any other 
to most Catholic writers. Father Keating, S.J., for example, 
says: 
One of the strongest arguments against war is that 
it necessitates a systematic spreading of falsehood 
in order to circumvent the enemy. The enemy must be 
painted absolutely black and accused of every imagi-
nable cruelty, as a monster outside the pale of human 
consideration. If this is not done, the hateful work 
of killing and being killed would be impossible. 24 
(italics added) 
If these and other evil means were really necessary, there 
could be no doubt about a just war being a moral impossibility; 
but as was noted in the introductory remarks there is no reason 
hich absolutely necessi.tates the employment of such means. The 
that such means have been, are being, and probably will be 
sed again does not make it impossible for a state to carry on a 
without resorting to them: abusus non tollit usus. 
It is difficult, therefore, to see how Donald Attwater, 
after enumerating six evils, among which propaganda is included, 
can say: 
Yet if only a single one of these six points (there are 
probably others) is true, that alone is enough to 
make war under modern conditions unjustifiable for either 
side (sic), whether aggressor or attacked; and tne 
nation that resorts to war is using an immoral means, 
for however worthy an end.25 
No doubt the circumstances of modern warfare do raise 
difficulties on this score. But as this thesis is not meant to 
discuss the problems arising from this condition in detail, it 
will only give the received doctrine with some general obser-
vations. 
First of all it is evident that no set of circumstances 
whatever can give any one licence to do what is intrinsecally 
evil. This Suarez states as the one limit even in case of war: 
Post inchoatum bellum, toto tempore ante partam vic-
toriam, justum est inferre hostibus omnia damna, 
quae vel ad satisfactionem, vel ad comparandam vic-
toriam necessaria videbuntur, dummodo non contineant 
intrinsecam injuriarn innocentum intrinsece malam.~6 
This restriction in a particularized form is of considerable 
mportance now, since it is closely bound up with one of the 
vils frequently attributed to either side by the other and is 
some writers to be a necessary phase of war today. It is 
irstly the question of bombing 11 open towns" and 11 strafing" 
efugee columns with aircraft machine gun fire. Neither of these 
s permissible because intrinsecally evil, if the collunns are 
eally refugees and the "open towns" open. Over and above this, 
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even though one side resorts to such means, the other side could 
not retaliate in kind; no circumstance permits intrinsic evil. 
If, however, the violation were a point of positive law, the 
opposite side would be free to use reprisals. 
The second intrinsically evil means forbidden by both St. 
Thomas and Suarez is mendacity. Suarez briefly answers the 
question, "an liceat uti insidiis in bello?" as posed by St. 
Thomas: 
Respondendum llcere, occultando prudenter consilium, 
non tarnen mentiendo.27 
The doctrine is simple and universal among the Scholastics; its 
application, however, is difficult. The excerpt from Father 
Keating's article earlier in this chapter expresses his opinion 
unequivocally and there are not a few who are inclined to agree 
with him. Propaganda certainly has its black side, but that a 
just cause must use outright falsehood to be effective seems to 
be equivalent to denying free will in the originators of prop-
aganda or branding the common people who 11 must" be so deceived 
as altogether without spirit. 
The second large aspect concerning means that must be 
mentioned is that they ought to be not in excess of what is nee-
essary to gain their end. This is applicable not only to war, 
but is a condition imposed on the exercise of coaction in any 
sphere. It applies as well to single indidents, such as person 
to person combats, detached battles, as well as to the war as a 
Whole. This restraint is called by the Scholastics, moderamen 
inculpatae tutelae. Thus, for example, to kill with the inten-
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tion of killing is not necessary in any event; it suffices even 
in the worst conditions to incapacitate the enemy for further 
aggression. 
A third major consideration under the head of means is the 
use of a good or indifferent means which will have a double 
effect, one good, from a military point of view, the other moral-
lY evil if considered in itself, such as for example, the death 
·( 
of non-combatants. Here again, as in the previous instance, the 
answer is not peculiar to war alone, but is common to all sim-
11ar predicaments. Such a means must not be used if the evil 
effect is a means to the achievement of the licit end, or if 
there is no sufficiently grave reason for permitting the evil 
effect. 
Over and above the four mentioned conditions, Suarez dis-
cusses a fifth which was exacted by Gajetan. Arguing from the 
principle that a ruler could not undertake a warwhich he clearly 
saw would bring greater harm than good to his people, he con-
cluded that before war could be undertaken the ruler must be 
morally certain of victory. Suarez, on his part, though conced-
ing the principle finds it hard to demand moral certitude. For 
an offensive war he requires, as a minimum, even chances; for a 
defensive war he thinks that war can licitly be attempted with 
less than an even chance because of the straits in which such 
aggression places a nation. 
Sed haec condicio non videtur mihi simpliciter nec-
essaria; primo quia humano modo est fere impossibilis. 
Secundo, ql...'ia saepe interest ad commune bonum reipub-
licae non expectare tantar.1 certi tudinem, sed tentare 
potius, etiam cum aliquo dubio, an coerceri hostes 
possint. Tertio, quoniam alias nunquam liceret regi 
minus potenti indicere bellum contra potentiorem, 
quia illam certitudinem, quam Cajetanus requirit, as-
sequi non potest. Quapropter d.icendum est, teneri 
quidem principem ad procurandam maximam certitudinem, 
quam possit, victoriae; debet item conferre spem vic-
toriae cum periculo damnorum, atque si omnibus pensa-
tis spes praevaleat. Si vero nequit tantam certitud-
inem assequi, oportet saltern ut hateat probabiliorem 
spem, aut aeque dubiam, juxta necessitatem reipublicae 
et boni communis. Quod si minor sit probabilitas de 
spe, et bellum sit aggressivum, fere semper est vitan-
dum; si defensivum, tentandum; quia hoc necessitatis; 
illud est voluntatis. 28 
+8 
The Ethics Committee of the Catholic Association for Inter-
national Peace likewise sees the practical impossibility of ful-
filling such a condition, and concludes it to be "sufficient 
that the government should have solid reasons, proportionate to 
the evil alternative of defeat, for expecting victory." 29 
The verification of the conditions enumerated above are, 
the last excepted, essential prerequisites before a state is 
justified in resorting to war. In the absence of the first or 
second condition the ensuing war is wholly a violation of jus-
tice. Failure to conduct it according to the demands of the 
third or fourth condition lays the state open to the guilt of 
prosecuting a good end with an evil intention or through re-
course to evil means. In the latter case the violation is one of 
strict justice; in the other instances it is against some other 
virtue. The first will vitiate the entire contest morally; the 
second that part which is influenced by the illicit element ac-
cording to the norm suggested in the introductory remarks. 
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PART TWO 
SOME PROBLEMS OF WAR 
Besides the traditional doctrine as viewed in its general 
outlines, there are numerous other questions which come up for 
consideration under each item, and this without any special 
attention paid to problems immediately concerned with war 
today. 
In the second part of this thesis, some attempt will be 
made to discuss first of all the types of war and their licit-
ness. Quite frequently authors state that the only war, if 
any, that. can be justified, is defensive: we will discuss that 
statement as well as pay some attention to the type of war 
known as punitive. 
The other topic selected fort his second part is the just 
cause and its inlplications. This condition, on analysis, seems 
to offer more difficulties today than does even the thorny 
question of means. 
Complete and minute solutions for even the few questions 
raised is hardly attempted. In fact, the only contribution on 
some scores is negative and serves only to disclose what seem 
to be false deductions made in the pursuit of a good end: the 
desire to avert war as a means of settling disputes and clashes 
in the field of international rights. 
CHAPTER III 
TYPES OF WAR 
After having analyzed the nature and end of war, and the 
conditions necessarily observed for it to be just, we must, 
because of contemporary confusion and open disagreement on the 
matter, consider the various types or kinds of war. 
All Catholic philosophers, as we have seen, admit that the 
right to wage war is a right conferred by the natural law on 
independent and sovereign states. This thesis, however, is 
said by some to refer to war in the abstract only, whereas 
the actual exercise of this natural right may become impossible 
under certain circumstances because of other considerations. 
Those who hold this view will usually restrict even this ab-
stract right to defensive war only. 
Others admit the above thesis and add tm t the right to 
declare an offensive (or aggressive) war is likewise included 
among the rights of a nation and that ooth of these types can 
still be licitly engaged in under modern circumstances. 
Over the third type of war, the punitive war, there is 
even a greater difference of opinion. Some maintain that the 
right to undertake such a war is altogether outside the 
jurisdiction of any state; others again vindicate the inclusion 
of the right to wage such a war under a state's natural rights, 
though all recent writers admit that great abuses have been 
committed in its exercise. 
In the present chapter we will examine the basis of the 
divergent views about defensive and offensive war, and try to 
come to some conclusions on the matter of punitive war. 
The disagreement concerning defensive and offensive (or 
aggressive) war is largely a matter of definition. Beginning 
apparently with Father Charles Plater, S.J., the definition for 
an offensive war became a war which "would always connote 
absence of provocation or justification.ul Or 1 as it is phrased 
by Father Cronin1 it is 
a war that presupposes no injury, and, in particular, 
a war undertaken merely in order to injure or destroy 
a State, or for purposes of enrichment at the ex-
pense of another State.2 
This definition is likewise espoused by the Ethics Committee of 
the Catholic Association for International Peace, and by those 
writers who descry all but defensive wars. Father Stratmann in 
his book1 The Church ~ ~, admits that "theoretically this 
kind of war can also be justified.u3 
From this admission it is evident that he does not al-
together subscribe to the previous definitions. Nor yet does 
he understand it exactly as do Suarez and those who distinguish 
defensive and off'ensi ve wars according to a different norm than 
the foregoing, as we shall see below. He seems, rather, to 
include under offensive warfare or aggressive warfare, as he 
calls it 1 punitive war as well. This seems evident from the 
following words which are the clearest expression of his con-
r cept of offensive war: 
So long as there is no supernational tribunal with 
international powers of punishment there will be 
no atonement unless the aggrieved State defends 
itself and calls the aggressor to account. This 
happens when the war is carried into the aggres-
sor's country and the aggrieved party takes the law 
into its own hands, in default of an arbitrator, 
and gets satisfaction. This since the time of 
Augustine, has been the tradition of the catholic 
Church With regard to the justification of an 
aggressive war.4 
No attempt is made to ascribe any intrinsic merit to one 
definition as against another; but one or the other must be 
determined on; and the definitions of others must be explained 
lest there arise misunderstandings with no real foundation in 
fact. 
Suarez defines these two types by distinguishing between 
the prevention of a violation while it is being attempted, and 
the vindication of a right already violated. 
Quocirca notandum est, an injuria sit in fieri 
moraliter, an facta jam sit at per bellum satisfac-
tio intendatur. Quando se habet hoc secundo modo, 
bellum est aggressivum: primo modo habet rationem 
defensionis, dummodo fiat cum moderamine inculpatae 
tutelae.5 • 
The distinction between these two types, let it be noted, 
rests on the proximity of a violation of right and its vindi-
cation and not on the wholly extrinsic and accidental consid-
eration of who f1rst takes up arms as it does in de vattel 1 s 
definition: 
Celui qui prend las armes pour repousser un ennemi 
qui l'attaque, fait une ~erre defensive. Celui 
qui prend les armes le premier et attaque una 
nation, qui vivait en paix avec lui, fait une 
guerre offensive.6 
According to this definition one could not even maintain the 
licitness of a "defensive" war until after having ascertained 
whether the defence was a just one or not. 
suarez innnedia tely makes it explicit just what he means 
by in fieri moraliter as it is used in his definition. 
E.xistimatur autem injuria esse in fieri quando vel 
revera ipsa actio injuriosa est-rn-rteri, physice 
etiam loquendo, ut quando homo non est omnino de-
jectus•a possessionis suae jure; vel dejectus qui-
dem est tamen in continenti, id est, sine notabili 
mora, procurat se tueri ac restituere.7 
These, then, are the definitions which will be understood 
in this thesis whenever there is mention made of either defen-
sive or offensive war. The reason for this is that all the 
classic writers on the subject thus define them. Suarez, in 
fact, after giving his definitions, says: "ita exponunt com-
muniter Doctores."B Grotius, in his classic, and after him 
Saint Alphonsus Ligouri, did not change them. Nor have more 
recent writers among whom may be noted Fathers Cathrein, S.3., 
Donat, S.J., and Nivard, S.J. 
Now we may examine the definition of those who maintain 
that only a "defensive" war can be just. A fairly recent and 
perhaps the most comprehensive one is given by the Ethics 
Committee. It is 
a war undertaken in defense of the people or in de-
fense of, or for the recovery of, the territory or 
property of the State.9 
On examination it is evident that such a defensive war 
includes at least as much as both defensive and offensive do 
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according to Suarez's definitions. In fact we shall see later 
that ~en its framers come to interpret their definition it 
really rolls up into one all three types of war. 
With these points noted about the defini tiona, there is 
considerably less trouble in discussing the question of licit-
ness so far as this depends on the type of war. For, de facto, 
all agree that both defensive and offensive as understood by 
suarez are in themselves licit. And, on the other hand, those 
who use his definitions will agree t:tn t n offensive warn when 
defined as "a war initiated without just and sufficient cause"l0 
must in all instances be branded as illicit. 
The reason for this unaimous opinion, as developed in 
Chapter one, is that the right to wage such wars is conceded to 
the individual states by the natural law to enable them to 
realize their end. So far, then, as these two types of war are 
concerned, there remains but one question to settle: granted 
their lawfulness theoretically (or in the abstract), can they 
be undertaken under modern circumstances? But this question no 
longer has anything to do with the type of war, and, in so far 
as it pertains to this thesis, is treated elsewhere. 
This brings us to the third kind of war commonly distin-
guished as punitive war, or, as some term it, vindictive war; 
it is also at times referred to as a war of retaliation. Since 
there are difficulties about the licitness of such a war even 
when it is considered abstractly, we will first of all give an 
exposition of the doctrine of Suarez pertaining to punitive war 
and then examine the objections brought against it by the 
Ethics Committee which, in reality, merely reasserts the 
objections of Father Cronin. After this we will offer some 
suggestions pertaining to the exercise under present day 
circumstances of this right to punish offending nations. 
S7 
Before entering upon Suarez's doctrine proper it is to be 
noted that he himself nowhere speaks of punitive war as such; 
administration of punishment is viewed by him as a just cause 
for war. Even when he does not speak of it as divorced from 
the questions of restoring a violated right and demanding re-
stitution for the damages suffered in war. The punitive action 
of one state always presupposes injury by another; and concern-
ing this injury, this violation of rights, Suarez asks two 
questions. Can the injured party demand restitution and in-
demnity? This is no more than commutative justice and he ob-
serves that there is no difficulty on that score. 
The second question is: can the offending State be 
punished? This question, he admits, has its difficulties • 
••• advertendum (est), circa injuriam illatam duo 
posse contendi. Primum est, ut restituantur per-
sonae offensae damna illata; hac vero de causa 
nulla est difficultas, posse licite indici bellum • 
••• Alterum est, ut qui offenderit, debita poena 
puniatur, in quo sita est difficultas.ll 
Thus the question for Suarez is not so much the lawfulness 
of a new type of war, but whether a State can back punitive 
demands made of the violating state by a renewal of war. 
Continuing the passage quoted above he gpes on to explain this, 
·adding that if the satisfaction demanded be forthcoming, further 
punitive action is precisely as unjust as further aggression 
would be after restitution was promised. 
Dico ergo secundo: justa etiam causa belli est ut 
qui injuriam intulit juste puniatur, si recuset 
absque bello justam satisfactionem praebere. Est 
communis, in qua et in praecedenti (concerning 
restitution in the above passage) est observanda 
illa condicio, ut non sit alter paratus restituere 
vel satisfacere; nam si paratus esset, injusta 
redderetur aggressio belli, ut in sequentibus 
dicemus.l2 
A careful reading of these two passages plus the pertinent ones 
in Cajetan's Commentary on the Fortieth Question of the Secunda 
Secundae mrdly warrants the description of "purely punitive" 
accorded this type of war by those who find difficulty in 
justifying it. 
Now we can advance to the reason given by Suarez for con-
ceding to one Sate such punitive prerogatives over another State 
that has inflicted injury by violating the first one's rights. 
The reason given, be it noted, is based on the necessity of 
such a power to insure peaceful relationships between nations. 
Ratio est, quia sicut intra eamdem rempublicam, 
ut pax servetur, necessaria est legitima potes-
tas ad puniendum delicta, ita in orbe, ut diver-
sae respublicae pacate vivant, necessaria est 
potestas puniendi injurias unius contra aliam.l3 
Proposing a difficulty taken from St. Paul to the effect 
that we should not return evil for evil, he lays down the 
conditions necessary for a right exercise of this punitive right 
and thus indirectly tells us more explicitly how punitive action 
favors the peaceful relationships between nations. 
Respondetur illud (Sancti Pauli) intelligi de 
privata auctoritate, et anima inferendi alteri 
malum per se; attamen si fiat potestate legitima 
et publica, atque animo continendi hostes in 
officio, et reducendi quod inordinatum erat ad 
debitum ordinem, non solum non est prohibitum, 
sed necessarium.l4 
The reason, then, why Suarez (and the same is true of 
cajetan) holds the right of punitive war to reside naturally 
in the state is that it is necessary to insure its well-being. 
And this is precisely the point ultimately at issue. For the 
committee on Ethics itself admits that: 
Cajetan's position stands or falls with our view 
of the connection between the State's right of 
punishing foreigners and the State's well being. 
If the State is really an imperfect and incomplete 
social entity incapable of conserving itself and 
attaining its purpose in the absence of this 
right, then, without doubt~ the State is fully 
vested with the right •••• lo 
To attempt a complete proof of this necessity by positive 
intrinsic arguments is beyond both the scope of this thesis and 
the ability of the author, since it would necessitate a wide 
knowledge of international affairs and problems. One r.eason 
may, however, be given: such punitive action will deter the 
guilty state from again violating justice. If this right of 
punishment were denied, an intransigent state could again renew 
hostilities as soon as it had the means--and this with impunity. 
In addition to this reason we will ~ite Saint Alphonsus Ligouri, 
Father Macksey, S.J., and Father Cathrein to furnish extrinsic 
proof. 
Saint Alphonsus says: 
Potest princeps, pro satisfactione, petere restitu-
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tionem ablatorum et expensarum; item aliquid in 
poenam illatae injuriae.l6 
saint Alphonsus does not explicitly go on to say that the State 
maY proceed with war if the satisfaction is refUsed, but, if it 
could not, the right to demand it would be futile. 
Father Macksey, S.J., is more comprehensive and explicit. 
He unequivocally states that: 
catholic philosophy, therefore,concedes to the 
State the full natural right of war, whether 
defensive, as in the case of another's attack in 
force upon it; offensive (more properly, coercive), 
where it finds it necessary to take the initiative 
in the application of force; or punitive, in the 
infliction of punishment for evil done against 
itself or, in some determined cases, against others. 
International law views the punitive right of war 
with suspicion; but, though it is open to wide 
abuse, its original existence under the natural law 
cannot well be disputed.l7 
Father cathrein not only concedes the right but states 
some reasons for its necessity as well: 
Indessen ist auchdie Berechtiging zu einem solchen 
Krieg eine notwendige Forderung der Ordnung und 
Sicherheit im Volkerverkehr. Wie es innerhalb des 
Gemeinwesens zur Erhal tung der Ordnung und des 
Friedens notwendig ist, dass es eine Gewalt gebe, 
welche das Recht hat, die Verbrechen zu strafen, so 
ist auch eine solche Gewalt notwendig fUr den Ver-
kehr der Volker untereinander. Blieben die ver-
brechen der Staaten untereinander ungestraft, so 
wiirden sie bald so uberhandnehmen, dass es um 
Ordnung und Sicherheit geschehen ware. Da es nun 
uber den Staaten keine hoheren Obern gibt, so 
konnen nur die Leiter derselben die Trager dieser, 
wenn wi~ so sagen dUrfen, internationalen Straf-
gewalt sein. Jades souverane Gemeinwesen hat also 
das Recht, die ibm zugefUgten Umbilden zu rachen.l8 
As·a negative proof we will take the objections proposed 
by the Ethics Committee and show that they are by no means new 
.-: 
but have been anticipated for the most part by Suarez himself. 
The first difficulty proposed is an ~ pari argument: just 
as an individual may, in case of necessity, resort to physical 
force only to defend his property or to recover it, but cannot 
go further and punish the wrongdoer; so also the state can but 
forcibly defend or recover rights, property, or territory.l9 
6/ 
The parallel is not at all clear; first of all, individuals 
admittedly do not have the natural right of acting as guardians 
of law and order, but the State cert~nly has that right over 
its citizens. Secondly, this natural right existing in the 
state can and should be appealed toby an individual even when, he 
has been able, of himself, to protect, for example, his propert.y 
or life. Let us say that such an individual succeeded in 
thwarting an attempt on his life. Can he not appeal to the 
State to proceed punitively against his aggressor? And should 
he not ordinarily do so in the interests of public law and 
order, even if he does not care to see the would-be assassin 
punished for the wrong done himself? 
But now let us take the example of a State which has 
suffered unjust aggression or has succeeded in preventing an 
aggressive attempt; again law and order have been violated. 
But the State, unlike the individual, has no other recourse than 
to take the administration of punishment into its own hands. 
This was foreseen by Suarez and because of it he and Cajetan and 
the others who defend pun~tive war maintained that the power 
must be inherent in the State. 
••• haec autem vindicta non potest peti ab alio 
judice, quia princeps de quo loquimur, non habet 
superiorem in temporalibus; ergo si alter non 
sit paratus ad satisfaciendum, compelli potest 
per bellum.20 . 
But this answer is still insufficient for Father Cronin 
.6Z 
who urges the difficulty arising from the equality between the 
one punishing and the one punished. 
War, be says, is a fight between equals, neither 
of whom has authority over the other, whereas 
punishment is inflicted by superior on inferior, 
by ruler on subject.21 
This objection, too, was considered by Suarez and answered by 
asserting that the guilty state was subject to the aggrieved 
state by reason of its crime • 
••• unde sicut supramus princeps potest punire sibi 
subditos quando aliis nocent, ita potest se vindi-
care de alio principe~ vel republica, quae ratione 
delicti ei subditur.2~ 
The same is affirmed in a later section: 
Haec autem potestas non est in aliquo superiore, 
quia nullum habet, ut ponimus; ergo necesse est, 
ut sit in supremo principe republicae laesae, 
cui alius subdatur ratione delict1.23 
Suarez himself proposes a more difficult objection. How, 
he asks, can the same person, the State, act as complainant, 
judge, and executioner--all in its own cause? This seems clear-
ly against the natural law. Granting all the difficulties in-
volved, he still holds it to be Je gitimate because of the 
necessity for some such punitive fUnction. And this function 
can have no other author, as things are, than the individual 
States.24 Such is also the conclusion reached by Father 
OA~h~A1n concernin~ this difficulty.25 
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After the majority of the Ethics Committee (for the opinio 
here noted is not unanimous)26 has given its objections to the 
doctrine of Cajetan and Suarez, it quotes a passage from 
Vittoria who, "on the authority of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas 
and all the Masters, teaches that 'aggressive warfare must have 
as its object the punishment of unjust dealing.•"27 Concerning 
this doctrine of so great an array of authorities the Committee 
continues: 
But if they are speaking of punitive war in the 
rigid sense of the word, either they must base their 
doctrine, as Cajetan does, on the necessity of such 
wars to the well-being of the state, and we argue 
against them as we did against Cajetan, or they 
must maintain that the nations have been entrusted 
With the dispensation and administration of divine justice towards one another.28 
That the Committee really means divine justice is explicitly 
brought out later when it says: 
''e are justified, then, it seems, in asserting that' 
neither nations nor tribunals established and re-
cognized by nations are, or in the ordinary course 
of God's providence, can be, the divinely institu-
ted custodians of the international moral order 
and, hence, that they cannot licitly wage punitive 
war for the sole purpose of satisfying God's justice.29 
We can certainly agree that this alternative is not 
tenable. The only point at issue is that no one maintmns it. 
The real basis for the right, as mentioned before, is its 
necessity to maintain law and order, i.e., to protect or re-
store the violated social order, not the moral order as such. 
The maintenance of this social order will de facto tend to 
restore the moral order established by God but this is per 
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accidens; per !! its maintenance by nations is for the purpose 
of protecting the general welfare. Father Nivard warns against 
such confusion when he says: 
Fontem vero facultatis puniendi ex parte civitatis 
non alium agnoscas nisi jus istius securitati suae 
aut alterius populi injuste oppressi providendi, 
unde ad futura damna praecavenda nocentes deter-
rendi vel impotentes reddendi.30 
So much, then, for the right to wage punitive w~r consider 
ed in the abstract. Turning now to the more practical 
of its exercise under modern circumstances, the answers of thos 
who defend and those who deny it practically agree, it seems. 
Those who defend the right, as we have seen, claim a state's 
right to include punitive measures in its peace demands; those 
who deny it, as the Ethics Committee, say that: 
If the enemy capitulates, ceases its aggression, • 
and declares its readiness to restore seized 
property and territory in full or its equivalent 
and to give adequate assurance of security for 
the future--and all these points fall within the 
scope of defensive warfare--the State's well-being 
can scarcely demand that the State now proceed to 
inflict punishment. One may cite as a possible 
objection the instance of a State that is a con-
stant menace and source of trouble to its neighbor 
State. Such a State, one might say, must experi-
ence the horrors of war in order to conceive pro-
per regard and respect for the rights of its neigh-
bor, or even it must be absorbed in its neighbor 
State before the security of the latter can be 
adequately assured. Even so, a war carried on un-
der these circumstances would be defensive, not 
punitive. It would be merely a matter of taking 
necessary protective measures and of exacting 
reasonable assurance of future security.31 
Between the two there seems to be no real practical dif-
ference. The defenders of the right call the demands punitive, 
the others, "adequate assurance of security for the future." 
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As a matter of1hct, the measures of "defence" licitly employed 
against the recalcitrant State mentioned in the passage are 
punitive in the extreme, whatever be the technical name given 
them. 
The real difference between the two schools would appear 
on the supposition that the enemy, though agreeing to resti-
tution, would refuse to make satisfaction for its violation, 
or as the others prefer, refused •to give adequate assurance ••• " 
Cajetan, Suarez, and the others noted, concluded: "campelli 
potest per bellum.• But this could hardly be defended today in 
its entirety owing to the changed conditions. At the time they 
formulated their doctrine war was confined to fewer peoples and 
had fewer repercussions on the world at large besides being 
less destructive. Thus today it seems likely that similar 
localized and regional wars alone could be resumed to exact con-
dign punishment. In the cases of more extensive wars the van-
quished could not be forced by a new punitive war to submit to 
punishment for the reason that the resultant good in this case 
would not be proportional to the evil entailed in again pro-
secuting the war. The Allies, according to this view, granting 
the justice of their cause, could licitly include punitive 
measures in their peace demands in 1919. They could not, how-
ever, have resumed the war had Germany refused to submit to 
them. 
Consequently, for all practical purposes, the abstract 
right to wage punitive war is, under modern circumstances, 
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greatly limited in its actual e~ercise. But this limitation 
comes not from its being a punitive war, as if that were the 
real reason for restricting its use, but from circumstances and 
conditions which prevail today. The right itself is no more 
called into question today than it was in the time of Suarez. 
It is the exercise of the right that is today curtailed. There 
fore, it would be more accurate today, when explaining what may 
be done in practice, to speak of a punitive peace than to speak 
of a punitive war. 
What those who deny the right to punitive war would con-
clude to in the supposition made above is not clear; since ad-
equate assurances of security are included under the licit pur-
poses of a defensive war, they could logically maintain that 
the war could be resumed until such guarantees were forthcoming 
But to call such a war a purely defensive war would be a rather 
loose use of that term. In reality, it would be more closely 
related to a preventive war, since its finis seems to be none 
other than the prevention of a similar violation in the future. 
In conclusion a few more words may be said of this pre-
ventive war. Ordinarily it is understood to be a war whose 
purpose is to forestall an expected violation of rights. Thus 
France and Poland might five years ago have argued that the en-
tire Germanic people was being drilled in a new philosophy of 
life for the sole purpose of forming a strong, unified country 
whose first aggressive steps must be into their territory. 
They might further have maintained that to take action then and 
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tb.ere would frustrate such morally certain consequences at a 
slight cost to themselves and the world at large, whereas delay 
could but mean, at best, a repetition of 1914 to 1918. 
Post factmn such reasoning seems to carry weight. But 
even granting morally certain knowledge that such fears will be 
realized, there still does not appear to be a just cause for 
starting war. One state can hardly start a war because of what 
it knows about another's intentions. There must be some vio-
lation of a real and perfect right. In the above supposition 
we prescind from the technical cause of war supplied Poland and 
France by Germany's rearming in violation of the treaty of 
Versailles. 
Justifiable wars, then, can come under three heads or one, 
according as we prefer to limit to one kind of war or extend to 
three kinds what all agree can licitly be exacted by force under 
certain circumstances. These latter will, for the most part, 
depend on the cause for war. Wherefore, the following chapter 
will be devoted to thls important condition. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE J'UST CAUSE 
In aprevious chapter more detailed treatment of the just 
cause was deferred for later treatment. We will now examine 
this important requisite condition somewhat more closely. 
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It has already been stated that only the violation of a 
perfect right can ever constitute a just cause. But immediate-
ly the further question of moral proportion occurs; for war, 
· physically considered, will, by its use of force, have both 
good and evil effects. in fact, not infrequently war, looked 
at as a whole, to say nothing of its particular phases, will 
cause evils that seem altogether disproportionate, especially 
under modern circumstances when any occurrence of importance 
has its echoes in even remote parts of the world. Nor can all 
these evils, by any me~ns, be described as merely physical; 
neither Will it suffice to say that war does not strictly cause 
such results but only occasions them. 
For this reason, then, the violation of a right, i.e. the 
cause, must be grave enough to justify its vindication, even in 
the face of the evils that will accompany such a step. In 
other words, to let the right be violated without seeking re-
dress must entail evils proportionately as great as would fol-
low from avenging the offense by war. It is this reason that 
led Suarez and all who write on the matter to state explicitly 
that the cause to be just must be grave and necessary: "causa 
haec iusta et sufficiens. est Jn>avis iniuria illata. nl l"!nn-
sequently, it is by no means sufficient to adduce any and 
violation of right as a just cause for war. However, it must b 
noted that the gravity of a given violation may be looked at in 
a two-fold manner. First of all there is the violation here 
and now perpetrated; this violation may not in itself be suffi-
ciently gr~ve to justify recourse to war owing to the lack of 
proportion. Thus, for example, one state might invade and take 
a very small section of another's country unjustly. If such a 
piece of territory were of small value and the declaration of 
war, in addition to the ordinary untoward consequences of war, 
were to endanger the state, it would be difficult, perhaps, to 
see such a transgression as a cause immediately proportionate. 
But this same relatively minor violation may also be con-
sidered more adequately and thus, perhaps, constitute a genu-
inely grave causa belli. In the example given the supposed in-
vasion might only be an initial act logically leading to fur-
ther and more serious violations. Or perhaps such a hostile 
act may be only one of a series of violations no one of which 
could be branded as surely proportionate, but whose cumulative 
gravity is un~estionable. Or, finally, such a violation, if 
not avenged, might serve as a precedent and temptation for other 
states to attempt the same tactics. Under such circumstances, 
though the immediate cause might be disproportionate, if con-
sidered alone, it might be proportionate if considered in its 
context. 
This view of the matter is explained by Suarez as one of 
the thin s to be noted under the ust cause: 
•••• primo, non quamcumque causam esse sufficien-
tem ad bellum sed gravem, et damnis belli pro-
portionatam. Contra rationem enim esset ob levem 
injuriam gravissima inferre damna. Ad haec judex 
non potest quaevis delicta punire, sed quae mili-
tant contra communem pacem, bonumque reipublicae. 
In quo tamen considerandum est, non raro apparere 
injuriam levem, quae revera gravis est, si omnia 
spectentur, vel si similes aliae permittantur, 
quoniam paulatim inde evenire possunt magna in-
commoda. Sic occupare vel minimum oppidum, verbi 
gratia, aliquando gravis injuria erit, vel ex-
cursiones facere, et., praecipue quando pr~nceps, 
qui injuriam fecerat, afunonitus contemnit. 
The causa belli, then, must be a grave injury immediately or 
mediately proportionate to the evils consequent on war whether 
these evils be directly caused, as physical evils, or only oc-
casioned or permitted, as moral evils. 
The restriction placed on the just cause above is one 
based on justice. Over and above justice, however, Suarez 
notes that charity as well may claim its due. Should the pro-
secution of a war, moral as far as strict justice is concern-
7~ 
ed, inflict extreme hardship on the offender, Suarez maintains 
that its declaration might be a violation of charity. The sup-
position under which this would be verified is that the satis-
faction wrung from the offender was not necessary for the of-
fended state and that it would burden to an extreme the culprit. 
Solum quaeri posset an detur interdum causa belli 
excusans ab injustitia, non vero a peccato contra 
charitatem. Respondendumque raro hoc accidere, 
non tamen quidquam repugnare; sicut enim inter 
privatos contingit, ut alter ab altero rem sibi 
debitam accipiat, proindeque non sit contra jus-
titiam, contra charitatem vero aliquando, nimirum 
si ea de causa debitor incurrat gravissima damna, 
et res illa creditori non sit valde necessaria, 
ita posset accidere inter principes et respublicas. 3 
l 
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Suarez grants that the hardships and trials that will re-
sult for such a state do not obligate the offended state to par-
ticularly great consideration, 
quia prava voluntas reipublicae !njuriam infer-
antis fuit causa illius (damni). 
He also mentions two other cases in which a just war, tak-
ing just in its strict sense, might be against charity: 
Secundo (damnum) illius quae bellum infert; tertio 
denique damnum fortasse totius ecclesiae.6 
Of these only the first will be considered since the second does 
not pertain to Ethics proper but rather to Theology. Concerning 
the damaging results of a war for the state undertaking it, he 
asserts that a lack of proportion between the vindication of a 
violation and the embarrassment it causes the state may well be 
not only against charity but against justice as well since the 
state is obliged in justice to provide for the common good be-
fore 6V'erything else: 
••• si princeps cum majori damno et periculo suae 
reipublicae infert bellum alteri, etiam cum justa 
causa, peccabit non solt~ contra charitatem, sed 
etiam contra justitiam debitam propriae reipublicae. 
Ratio est quia princeps tenetur ex justitia magis 
providere communi bono suae ~eipublicae, quam pro-
prio; alias tyrannus evadit. · 
Owing to the existence today of other forms of government be-
sides monarchies a slight interpretation is required. Instead 
of saying that the king or ruler must provide for the common 
good in preference to his private advantage, we would understand 
the government, technically considered, as obliged to concern 
itself primarily with the good of the people rather than itscwn 
particular advantage. 
All these elements, then, must be considered when trying to 
determine the proportion between the cause of war and the con-
sequent evils. In modern times, as intimated berore, a further 
complication sets in: the evils to the world at large that are 
sure to rollow almost any war owing to the close economic, po-
litical, and cultural relationships of modern nations. It is 
true that these factors are not direct determinants in weighing 
the proportion, and that they may be subordinated, to some ex-
tent, to the vindication of a violated right by war. And yet it 
cannot be denied that the causa belli, considering only the dif-
ficulties about proportionate evil, must today be much more 
weighty than heretofore. 
A second aspect of the just cause leads us to the same con-
clusion: it must be impossible to rectify the deordination which 
constitutes the potential cause for war by any other means. In 
other words, war can only be undertaken as the last means to 
protect or vindicate rights. This has been the unanimous opin-
ion of all scholastic philosophers from the time of St. Augus-
tine; Suarez cites him with approval when he says: 
bellum quoad fieri possit, esse vitandum, et 
solum in necessitate extrema, quando nullum 
aliud medium superest, tentandum ••• s 
Suarez himselr immediately includes this restriction to 
war in the very first sentence about the just cause. He de-
mands a genuine cause which involves necessity and which cannot 
be composed in any other manner. 
Dico ergo prime: nullum potest esse justum bellum, 
nisi subsit causa legitima et necessaria. Est 
conclusio certa et evidens. Rursus, causa haec 
justa et sufficiens, est gravis injuria illata, 
quae alia ratione vindicari aut reparari nequit.9 
Strictly speaking, therefore, no cause, however grave, con-
stitutes a just cause for war of itself; it must be impossible 
to remove that cause of grievance by any and all other means. 
Cardinal Bellarmine, when treating this question, gives one 
of the reasons for requiring extreme necessity: 
Quoniam bellum est medium quoddam ad pacem, 
sed valde grave et periculosum, ideo non esse mox 
inferendum bellum, cum caussa existit, sed esse 
prius procurandam pacem aliis rationibus fac~­
oribus, nimirum pacfbice petendo ab hostibus debi-
tam satisfactionem. 
The basic reason for requiring such preliminary negotiations is 
to be found in the ehical nature of war. As a species of co-
action it is the property of a right which can only be exercised 
for the protection or restoration of its subject matter in case 
of necessity. This restriction, therefore, will naturally bring 
its full force into play in the case of war where many private 
rights are necessarily subordinated to the common good and where 
enormous upheavals are quite likely to occur once hostilities 
have actually begun. 
Although the means to compose differences short of war were 
not as fully developed in the days of Suarez as they now are, 
still he makes the following demands: 
•••• ante bellum inchoatum tenetur princeps pro-
ponere justam causam belli reipublicae contrariae, 
ac petere restitutionem condignam, quam si altera 
offerat, tenetur acceptare, et a bello desistere; 
quod si non faciat, bellum erit injustum; si 
alter vero neget satisfictionem, tunc poterit jus te bellum inchoare. 
Here, then, we have the minimum requisite before declar.tng an 
offensive war; in case of defensive war, according to our de-
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finition, tberewould be no opportunity for such considerations. 
Before passing on to mention some of the alternatives to 
war that are available today, we can note how Suarez answers 
Cajetan's conclusion that the aggrieved state need not heed 
offers of restitution and satisfaction if made after war has 
once been declared. The reason offered by Cajetan is that the 
aggrieved state, after having been refused its demands, becomes 
a quasi-judge with power to proceed to the finish without the 
obligation of accepting the restitution and satisfaction 
offered. Beyond the difference in the degree of injury to be 
made good, however, Suarez can see no other change when the 
matter is analysed: war is only to be declared when one is 
forced by necessity; otherwise it is unjust. Therefore, if 
after a war's inception, legitimate demands are satisfied, 
there is no longer any necessity for carrying it on. It must, 
therefore, be terminated. (Cajetan had remarked that after the 
actual joining in battle--actualem congressum--the aggrieved 
state no longer was obligated:) 
Si vero per actualem congressum, intelligat bellum 
illud in quo a!Iquoties pugnatum est, non video quo 
firmo fundamento asseratur, magis esse (principem) 
tunc dominum causae, quam ante bellum inchoatum, 
quia idem jus antea habeoat ad inchoandum bellum, 
quod nunc habet ad prosequendum. Solum interest 
quod injuria crevit, et consequenter crevit jus ad 
majorem satisfactionem. Praeterea rationes factae 
aeque procedunt in utroque ex dictis eventis~ quia si-
cut initium, ita continuatio belli debet esse neces-
sitatis. Ad haec, quia similiter sequuntur damna 
contra bonum commune, quae vitari debent salvo inte-
gro jure proprio, quod quidem est salvum, quando 
offertur satisfactio, quia nihil magis peti potest 
post partam victoriam, ut dicemus. Denique jus 
belli est odiosum, et poena ejus gravissima; ergo 
restringenda est, quoad fieri potest.l2 ' 
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suarez, therefore, insisted on utilizing any means avail-
able that gave hope of avoidii.1.g actual war. This principle, 
therefore, and not the means pointed out explicitly by him 
(since these were relative to his day) is the important matter. 
And this principle obliges to greater caution today because of 
the increased means of composing differences short of actual 
war. 
we may here quote a modern interpretation of Suarez's 
principle as found in the Catholic Encyclopedia: 
Furthermore, a clear title is limited to the con-
dition that war is necessary as a last appeal. 
Hence, if there is reasonable ground to think that 
the offendine state will withdraw its menace, repair 
the injury done, and pay a penalty sufficient to 
satisfy retributive justice and give a fair guarantee 
of the future security of juridical order between the 
two states concerned--all in consequence of proper 
representation, judicious diplomacy, patient urgency, 
a mere threat of war, or any other means this side 
of actual war itself cannot as yet be said to be a 
necessity, and so, in such premises, lacks fUll 
title. A fair opportunity of adjustment must b.e 
given, or a reasonable assurance had that the of-
fence will not be rectified except under the stress 
of war, before the title is just.l3 
Besides the means explicitly mentioned in the above ex-
cerpt there remain the possibilities of compromise or settle-
ment through arbitration, and embargo. The inclusion here of 
arbitration does not formally stand at variance with what was 
said of it earlier. There exception was taken to the opinion 
that claimed modern states had ceded their right to war to a 
court of arbitration. Here it is merely meant to indicate that 
a state before declaring war should consider the possibility of 
arbitrating through some such organization as long as there is 
a reasonable hope of effecting an understanding thereby. In 
fact, Father Macksey is of the opinion that: 
when the grievance is not clear, and the-public 
authority has sound reason to think that it can 
arrange for a tribunal where justice will be done, 
it would seem that the necessity of war in that 
individual is not final, and even though inter-
national law may leave the state free to refuse 
all arbitration, the natural law would seem to 
commend if not to command it.l4 
The precise nature of such an obligation, and the degree of 
assurance of a just decision necessary before accepting its 
decisions are matters too involved for this thesis. We wish 
merely to make the point that such means, when available and 
efficacious, must first be exhausted before war can be legiti-
mately declared. 
A further means, approaching, though still short of war, 
is the use of such economic weapons as will force, at least 
morally, a serious reconsideration of the advisability of 
respecting the rights of others. These means, such as the boy-
cott or embargo, may well be unavailing in the case of smaller 
countries against larger ones; but larger and more important 
countries could resort to such action rather than immediately 
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draw the sword. Such measures, even granting they are insuffi-
cient of themselves, would nevertheless give a certain period 
of time for reflection and the abatement of excitement. 
Up until now this chapter has concerned itself with the 
causa belli objectively considered: it must be proportionate to 
the evils involved in making war and it must be impossible to 
rectify the violation in any other way. There are, however, a 
number of problems associated with the cause in its subjective 
aspects. 
Two of these, because they belong neither entirely to an 
objective nor to a subjective view, may find their place here. 
The first is the question whether both sides in a war can have 
a just cause. This is obviously impossible if one means an 
objectively just cause, for in any circumstances there can be 
no genuine collision of rights; either the apparently conflict-
ing rights of one are non-existent or they are subordinate to 
those of another. 
Bellum nequit esse, objective loquendo, ex utraque 
parte for.maliter et materialiter justum.l5 
If, on the other hand, one is questioning the possibility ot a 
subjectively just cause on both sides, there is no intrinsic 
repugnance to such a state. For it can be that, owing to ig-
norance, both sides may believe themselves in the right. For 
example, in 1916, as at the present, England violated what we 
sincerely considered to be our rights by censoring our mails, 
using information therein contained, and hindering our commerce. 
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England then, as now, might have maintained in good faith that 
this was her prerogative in time of war and no violation of 
right. Now given these circumstances, if we had decided to 
defend our rights by war as was actually threatened, she m uld, 
in her own view, have justly repelled us as agressors. In such 
an event, though a just cause could objectively exist only on 
one side, still subjectively both might have considered them-
selves justified. 
This very unsatisfactory conclusion was, perhaps, respon-
sible for the opinion of certain contemporary ethicians that 
formal guilt, as against material guilt, must be established 
before the opposing side could claim a just cause.l6 That is, 
the guilty party must know that it was objectively wrong and, 
in spite of this confession, continue doing the wrong. The 
arguments adduced to prove this view, though fallacious, sound 
fairly plausible. Father Stratmann, for example, argues thus: 
the objective violation (that is, the material guilt) can 
either be proved such, or it cannot. If it can, ~ ipso it 
becomes formal; if not, it is not even an objective violation 
and consequently there is not even material guilt. This argu-
ment supposes that anything and everything can be conclusively 
proved to both sides, so that one or the other side must be in 
bad faith once the proof for the thesis has been given. The 
view, consequently, that would demand the establishment of 
formal guilt, desirable as it undoubtedly is, unfortunately 
cannot be defended, owing ultimately to the very nature of our 
finite and clouded intellect, to say nothing of the influence 
exerted by conditions of high stress and excitement. Conse-
f/ 
quently, it is difficult to maintain with Father Stratmann that 
one of the ten points to be verified for a just war is 
Gross formal moral guilt on one side--material 
guilt is not sufficient.l7 
In addition it is not without temerity that he claims all ten 
points (consequently this one also) contain 
The principles which constitute a just war accord-
ing to St. Augustine, the Thomists, and Francis de 
Victoria.l8 
Coming now to a consideration of the just cause as viewed 
subjectively, we may distinguish two different classes that 
will be affected: the rulers (or the government) and the common 
people. 
The problem under consideration in either case is whether 
and to what degree certitude must be had that one's cause in 
war is just. A general answer that will cover both cases is 
that in the case of war, as elsewhere, one must have practical 
certitude one way or the other before one can partake in or de-
cline from action. The whole difficulty lies in the question 
of speculative certitude. Suarez teaches this in the following 
words: 
o •• supponendum (est) in omnibus requiri certi-
tudin~ practicam, quae explicatur hoc judicio: 
Mihi licitum est bellare. Dubium totum vertitur 
ae-certitudine speculativa, quae ita explicatur: 
Haec causa belli jubti est in se; vel: Haec res, quam praetendo per e lUID; nea-est.l9 ---- ---
- - ----
All then must have practical certitude, but the foundation ~f 
this certitude would seem to differ in the case of the cormnon 
people and that of governments. In the latter case the certi-
tude must be based on intrinsic motives, i.e., on reasons de-
rived from the nature of the violation itself. As Suarez puts 
it: 
supremus rex tenetur ad diligentem causae et 
justitiae examinationem, qua facta, op~rare 
debet juxta scientiam inde comparatam. 0 
One point in particular concerning Suarez may be noted 
·here briefly, since some have made of it a major issue. In a 
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case where the ruler finds that his causa belli is only more 
probable, Suarez permits him to wa3e war. - It is evident from 
his g~neral statement, quoted above, that he refers here to 
speculative probability; and yet when Father Stratmann cornments 
on this opinion, he in inclined to overlook this distinction 
and writes as if it might refer to a practical doubt. Moreover, 
he so colors his presentation that one would think Suarez's 
position utterly indefensible: 
Suarez teaches that a ruler may go to war knowing 
that a great deal of right is on the opposite 
side, but conS.1dering tb.B.t, on the whole, more 
right is on his sidel Here we have the first 
loosening of the old, strict war morality. The 
terrors of'war are to be let loose because the 
balance is ever so slightly on the aggressor's 
side! Though even Suarez recoramends an umpire. 
His point of view is most repulsive, for he holds 
strongly to the punitive character of the agres-
sor.2I 
Be then quotes Vasquez, S.J., as saying: 
I could never accept such teaching, on the con-
trary I have always held its dubiousness and 
believe that it ~ay do great harm to Christian-
ity. That might is right is simply a return to 
B3 
barbarism.22 ' 
In the first place, no specific reasons are given by Strat-
mann for rejecting such an opinion. And secondly, the quota-
tion from Vasquez, which he quotes with approval, condemns the 
opinion, because it seems to him an espousal of the principle 
that might is right; whereas such is by no means Suarez's rea-
son for permitting it. His contention is that 
in sententiis ferendis sequenda est semper pro-
babilior pars, quia ille est actus justitiae 
distributivae, in qua dignior est praeferendus.23 
But above all Stratmann's phrase "e'ren Suarez recommends an 
umpire" is somewhat uncalled for. Far from being dismissed 
with a phrase Suarez's opinion on the necessity of arbitration 
and the reasons proposed to validate the opinion are worthy of 
quotation and praise as a genuine effort to diminish the pos-
sibilities of war: 
Sed quaeres an in hujusmodi casibus teneantur 
supremi principes arbitrio bonorum virorum 
judicium relinquere. Est autem quaestio, stan-
do in lege naturali tantum, ut omittamus Papae 
auctoritatem, de qua jam diximus. Censeo vero 
probabilem valde esse partem quae affirmat: etenim 
tenentur ii, quoad possunt, vitare bellum hon-
estis mediis. Si ergo nullum periculrun injusti-
tiae timeatmr, nam impossibile est auctorem na-
turae in eo discrimine relinquisse res humanas, 
quae freqentius conjecturis potius quam certa 
ratione reguntur, ut omnes lites inter principes 
supremos et respublicas, nonnisi per bellum ter-
minari debeant; est enim id contra prudentiam ac 
bonum commune generis humani; ergo contra justi-
tiam. Praeterquam quod jam regulariter ii haber-
ent majus jus, qui potentiores essent, atque adeo 
ex armis esset metiendum, quod barbarum et ab-
surdum satis apparet.24 
The pp..rase "probabilem valde • • • • • • • par tem, tt "vi tare bellum 
honestis mediis, 9 and the last sentence are hardly correctly 
described as a "return to barbarism. 9 
14 
That Suarez's point of view is not literally repulsive may 
be gathered from the fact that no less an authority than St. 
Alphonsus Liguori says that, although he himself prefers certi-
tutle, still Suarez's opinion is sufficiently probable, and, 
speculatively considered, is sound intrinsically: 
Mihi autem, licet secunda sententia (Suarez's) 
satis probabilis, speculative loquendo, etiam 
intrinsece videatur.25 
As far as the practical conclusion is concerned all seem 
to agree. Owing to the damages, moral dangers, and actual evils 
that follow war a ruler must have certitude before he is justi-
fied in declaring it. Suarez merely gave as a probable opinion 
that a ruler might, if no other way were feasible, act on a 
more probably just cause. He does not advocate this use of 
probabilism generally, but limits it to an unnsual case which 
would rarely arise in practice. So, even were it admitted that 
he erred on this subtle point, there is no valid reason for 
generalizing from it and calling his entire approach into 
question. The opinion of St. Alphonsus regarding Suarez's 
position shows that it is not without considerable weieht as a 
speculative opinion. 
Turning now from the ruler or government to the common 
people, practical ce~tude is again required, but here the 
motive for certitude need not be intrins.ic. I<'or from the very 
nature of the case, individuals frequently cannot be expected 
to deduce the licitness or illicitness of war for themselves. 
They can only resort to extrinsic sources such as authority to 
settle their possible doubts. Thus if an individual had a 
speculative doubt as to the lawfulness of a war# he could re-
solve it in favor of participation because he must give his 
lawfully constituted government the benefit of the doubt: he 
knows with certitude that he must obey legitimate authority in 
everything that is not sin and over which it has jurisdiction. 
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If, however# an individual knew certainly that a war was unjust# 
he could not take part in it. Both Cardinal Bellarmine and 
Suarez affirm this doctrine. The former, in fact, teaches ex-
9licitly that if a ruler were to undertake a war without a just 
cause he would certainly sin. He then goes on to consider the 
common soldier's position under such circumstances: 
••••• milites autem non peccant nisi constaret 
certo bellum esse illicitum; debent enim subiti 
parere superiori, nee debent discutere imperia 
ejus, sed potius praesumere debent principem 
suam bonam caussam habere, nisi manifeste con-
trarium noverint.26 
Suarez more explicitly explains just why, even in case of 
a speculative doubt# an individual can safely form his con-
science in favor of the ruler's action: 
••••• communes milites subditi principum nullam 
diligentiam adhibere tenentur, sed vocati ad 
bellum ire possunt, dummodo illis non constat 
esse injustum. Probatur tum quia quando iis 
militibus non constat de injustitia belli, con-
silium commune principis et regni satis illis 
est ad eundum; tum etiam quia subditi# in dubio 
(speculative, scilicet), tenentur obedire super-
iori, idque optima ratione. Nam in dubiis tutior 
pars est eligenda; cum autem prince~s possideat 
jus suum, tutius est illi obedire.2 
This conclusion holds even today in spite of the danger 
the individual may run of materially cooperating in evil. To. 
hold otherwise would differ little from demanding of every in-
dividual a judicial decision concerning matters which historian 
and moralists years a~rwards find difficult to decide. In ad-
dition any other view would practically deprive the state of 
authority granted it by the natural law over its citizens. The 
general rule, therefore, for private individuals is that they 
must obey unless the ingustice is evident; to obey in this 
latter case, even granting that an individual's conscience was 
de facto erroneous, would be to act against a certain judgment 
of conscience, which is always illicit. 
If the conclusions above pertaining to individuals be true, 
and it seems that the only other alternative is a moral im-
possibility (scil., that individuals decide for themselves), 
then it is rather misleading for a writer like Donald Attwater 
to say, as he does, that "the man-in-the-streettt cannot safely 
follow his government. He himself avers that: 
The rights and wrongs in a particular dispute 
are usually so complicated and obscured by 
partisan ?ropaganda that it is virtually im-
possible for the man-in-~§e-street to arrive 
at a decision upon them. 
And yet when the author comments on the advice given "even by 
Christian clergy," as he says, "that he can safely follow his 
government," he continues: 
With all respect to these clergymen, that is 
just what he cannot do-- the idea that a man 
can safely submit his conscience to a secular 
government is one of the most grotesque perver-
f7 
sions that has occurred in contemporary religion.29 
Certainly one must concede that today's governments are 
not exemplary and have little regard for Christian morality. 
And one would like to see a way out of the high probability of 
material wrong being done by following such a government. And 
yet, to make each individual his own judge isequivalent to an-
archy and reductively a denial of the natural origin of the 
state as an essentially needed organism for the full develop-
ment of man. It is not, then, from choice nor from a desire 
to further increase the power of the state that one finds fault 
with his conclusion, but from sheer necessity. This necessity 
is both social and individual, as already pointed out. Socially 
obedience to legitimate authority wherever sin is 'not commanded 
is a neceBity; while to the individual the clear duty of obedi-
ence gives a practical norm without which he admittedly could 
not, in modern circumstances, resolve the practical doubts which 
will assail him regarding such questions as war. 
Two further points in the quotation may be noted. First 
of all, the author seems to give the wrong meaning to the word 
safely. He seems to understand that objective rectitude of 
action is safely entrusted to the judgment of the government. 
In seriously questioning this he is quite right; but when safel] 
is used by authors or counsellors who give such advice, it pri-
marily means that it is safe for the individual's conscience to 
resolve his doubt in favor of the government. It means that by 
acting thus an individual can acquire the practical certitude 
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absolutely necessary for moral action. In a word, safely refers 
not to objective but to subjective morality. 
The second point pertains to his concept of the state. A 
note appended to the quoted passage indicates that the author 
is uncertain whether the doctrine of the classical theologians, 
who envisaged a Christian state, can be applj_ed to today's 
secularist states. The tone seems to indicate that even in es-
sentials a Christian state qua state would have more power in 
general, or certain specific powers which a non-Christian state 
does not have. This is hardly true; the purely natural state, 
the secularist state, or the Christian state are basically 
societies ordained by God through the natural law, and can all, 
in their legitimate sphere, claim the obedience of their sub-
jects. This right is certain and binds the citizen in conscienc 
as well as does any other moral behest. Consequently, in 
cases of necessity this clear moral obligation takes precedence 
over an individual's speculative doubt concerning the licitness 
of an action performed or demanded of him by the state. 
The reason for the above criticism, let it be repeated, is 
by no means a desire to abet the state's usurpation of rights. 
That must be condemned. But to attack the very concept of the 
state is hardly the right way to effect this. The real reason 
for maintaining what we do is to avoid insoluble problems in 
the form of practical doubts from harassing the ordinary people 
of the world. 
Although there are undoubtedly more problems that can and 
~ 
do come up under the con~ion of the just cause, those mentionec 
above may serve as an indication of their nature and general 
method of solution. 
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In the foregoing chapters we have seen that war as a con-
test carried on by force of arms between two or more indepen-
dent states or communities is a species of coaction when legit-
imately employed to defend or regain the subject matter of 
strict rights. Its end is the defense, maintenance, or resto-
ration of the juridical order as established by, or based on, 
the natural law. The licit exercise of the coerciom in ques-
tion is conditioned in general by the same determinants as any 
other form of coercion, soil., the law which confers the right 
and the end ~or which the end was granted. So, also, must its 
employment be necessary and proportioned to the attainment of 
its purpose. 
These general principles have, in the case of war, been 
embodied in the traditional conditions for a just war. We saw 
that war, to be just, must be undertaken by legitimate author-
ity; must have a just cause; must be prosecuted by licit means 
• 
and with a good intention. 
Concerning the types or kinds of war that can be justified 
we concluded that the answer will greatly depend on the defini-
tions determined on beforehand for each kind. In the main we 
found that most writers agree as far as practical conclusions 
are concerned and differ only in their views of the name under 
which these conclusions shall be classified. It was, however, 
suggested that punitive war must today be restricted in most 
cases to the inclusion of punitive stipulations in the vic-
tor's demands. Strictly speaking, this restriction does not 
.condemn or nullify the concept of a punitive war. It merely 
recognizes the impossibility of fulfilling one of the requi-
sites for a just war- the necessary proportion between the 
evil to be righted by the war and the evils consequent on 
righting such violations. 
On analyzing more thoroughly the requisite just cause for 
· war, it was found that there must be a violation of a strict 
right, i.e., one which imposes the juridical duty of respect-
ing it in another. There must also be a proportion between 
the violated right and the means used to restore it, together 
with its immediate consequences. A third point established 
was that such a cause, to be sufficient, was not amenable to 
any other rectification, or, in other words, war, to be just, 
must be the last resort. 
On the verification of all these conditions moralists hold 
that a war would be licit. As noted throughout this thesis, 
however, there is a definite trend on the part of some contem-
porary authors to maintain that modern war can under no cir-
cumstances be licitly waged. Their contention, if analyzed, 
will always be based on the impossibility of realizing all the 
conditions simultaneously. The means employed in modern war-
fare, in particular, are singled out by most writers as the 
one condition no longer verifiable. 
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To the writer, modern means, taken in themselves, do not 
constitute the great problem. In themselves these do, it is 
true, constitute a source of greater devastation and are more 
easily perverted in their use; in themselves, though, they are 
to a great extent still indifferent morally. The airplane, 
machine-gun, submarine, and propaganda have their legitimate 
sphere of licit activity and influence. It is precisely the 
question of the use to which these modern means are put that 
presents the problem. However, the use to which they are sub-
ordinated is extrinsic to the particular means themselves and 
depends entirely on the deterrnination of the respective 
belligerents. 
It is here, then, to the writer's mind, that attention 
should be focused when analyzing and condemning modern war--
the attitude and activity of governments. To attack modern 
warfare alone is to stigmatize an effect without so much as 
adverting to the cause whence it takes its origin. 
Too often war is looked at by such authors not in its true 
juridical function, but rather from the erroneous viewpoint of 
modern statesmen. For many statesmen, and not a few political 
philosophers outside the scholastic tradition, the state is the 
creator and arbiter supreme of all rights. Naturally such a 
doctrine will lead to violations of natural law in the inter-
national juridical order. And such de facto violations will 
not only be condoned but even sponsored by a government whose 
basic concepts of its own nature are false. Consequently, it 
r is the modern doctrine of the positivistic state and its cor-
ollary that the state grants all rights, that ought to be im-
pugned. For unless the nature of the state be correctly un-
derstood in theory, and unless the state, at least in general, 
conduct itself accordingly in practice, any condemnation or 
complaint of isolated actions seems doomed to failure. With-
out undermining this false concept of the state any attempt to 
thwart its objectively false activity is deprived ofi all 
cogency. 
The same reasoning may be applied to the question of the 
just cause and its ramifications. Given a positivistic polit-
ical creed it is not to be wondered at that states fail to 
consider seriously the moral obligation of exhausting all 
means short of war, or to heed the question of proportion. 
In such a creed there is no morality to be taken into consid-
eration independent of, and antecedent to the state itself. 
The idea that states and their activities do not come under 
the ordinary moral law, or any moral law, ~ut rather consti-
tute a-moral entities cannot but end with immoral results: 
the precision becomes a privation. 
However, the fact that there are political philosophers 
who advocate such views and states that carry them into effect 
does not justify us in condemning certain activities as such 
independently of the person who carries them out and the motive 
with which they are done. 
War is one such activity. Essentially, there seems to be 
r 
no difference between war today and war two hundred years ago. 
To be justified, it is true, rights of the gravest kind must 
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be at stake and all available means short of actual war ex-
hausted. Were all states conscious of, and at least theoreti-
cally, willing to admit the grave obligations incumbent on 
them, it is true that war would be practically impossible. But 
precisely because many have forsaken any adherence to an objec-
tive standard of morality will it be necessary for other states 
to resort to force to preserve their independence, freedom, and 
corresponding rights by means of war. 
There is surely no one who will contend that F'inland acted 
immorally when it resorted to war against the inroads of 
Russia; or that Belgium was not justified in pitting her entire 
strength against the Nazi invasion even though it probably knew 
that, at best, its loss of men and property would constitute 
not much more than a determined stand against the philosophy of 
Natism. 
When we come to examine the justifying elements of such 
wars, it is hard to gainsay their validity, however desirous we 
may be to outlaw war. The intentions were to preserve and pro-
tect the state's very existence; the cause was actual aggres-
sion by the enemy and, at least materially, the attempt to pre-
vent the further spread of an outlook that glorified brute 
force over moral rights in both individual and social relation-
ships-- and this on principle. The means used were all the 
forces available that might repulse the foe, without, at least 
r 
to our knowledge, including anything intrinsically evil. 
That war was resorted to only as a last measure was evi-
dent in the two instances cited. And it is quite conceivable 
that with the spread and growing influence of some of today 1 s 
Machiavellian philosophies, war may well become the only·resort 
possible. For with a state-created morality, veracity, the 
sanctity of agreements, and similar instruments of social se-
curity will no longer have independent validity when contracted 
with such parties. 
Whether there can or cannot be a cause proportionately 
grave with the evil consequences is likewise called into ques-
tion today. Apart from the evils entailed for the countries 
actually engaged there is frequent mention made of the disrup-
tion of normal relationships caused throughout the world. That 
this is true is undeniable. But even so, there seem to be 
causes which are altogether proportionate even to such evils. 
There are, in fact, indications that such proportionate causes 
are already in the lists, if not formally at least materially. 
The two causes that seem proportionate to any amount of damage 
and material or per accidens evil are the defense of the right 
to worship God and the concept that moral rights are genuine 
and valid rights which must be respected. In these cases there 
is not question of this or that particular right, but of the 
very idea that a moral right is an objective reality; neither 
is there question of some particular method of worship or creed, 
but the basic concept of the right to recognize a supreme Being. 
r Now these two keystones of individual and social relationships 
are absolutely sine qua non conditions for any pretense of an 
ordered and reasonable state of human existence. Without them 
all other considerations are meaningless; man would be subordi-
nated to the position of a means to an end; his entire orienta-
tion and its realization would be frustrated at its very root. 
The danger of relinquishing the right to use force to 
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those only who will use it to such nefarious purposes is the 
primary purpose for f1.nding fault with those who condemn it as 
morally illicit. The emphasis placed on the nature of th.e state 
and its duties and end, and the appeal for a more fundamental 
approach to the problem of war--these were both stressed be-
cause therein lies the real solution to the practical problems 
confronting us in international affairs. 
r 
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